ALLERGAN INC Form 425 July 18, 2014

Investor Presentation Regarding the Allergan Special Meeting Process July 18, 2014

Filed by Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.

(Commission File No. 001-14956) pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act of 1933 and deemed filed pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Subject Company: Allergan, Inc. Commission File No.: 001-10269

Forward-Looking Statements

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This communication may contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform A forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements regarding Valeant offer to acquire Allergan, its financing performance (including expected results of operations and financial guidance), and the combined company s future financial compan Forward-looking statements may be identified by the use of the words anticipates, intends, expects, plans, opportunity, tentative, positioning, designed, predict, potential, target, create, project, seek, ong expressions. These statements are based upon the current expectations and beliefs of management and are subject to numerous

change over time and could cause actual results to differ materially from those described in the forward-looking statements. The but are not limited to, assumptions, risks and uncertainties discussed in the company is most recent annual or quarterly report for Administrators (the CSA) and assumptions, risks and uncertainties relating to the proposed merger, as detailed from time to which factors are incorporated herein by reference. Important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from the communication are set forth in other reports or documents that we file from time to time with the SEC and the CSA, and include the company is most recent annual or quarterly report for the compan

the ultimate outcome of the offer and the second-step merger, including the ultimate removal or the failure to render inapplicate offer and the second-step merger described in the offer to exchange;

the ultimate outcome and results of integrating the operations of Valeant and Allergan, the ultimate outcome of Valeant s pric and the ultimate ability to realize synergies;

the effects of the proposed combination of Valeant and Allergan, including the combined company s future financial condition

the effects of governmental regulation on our business or potential business combination transactions;

the ability to obtain regulatory approvals and meet other conditions to the offer, including the necessary stockholder approval,

Valeant s ability to sustain and grow revenues and cash flow from operations in our markets and to maintain and grow our cus related capital expenditures and the unpredictable economic conditions in the United States and other markets;


the impact of competition from other market participants;

the development and commercialization of new products;

the availability and access, in general, of funds to meet our debt obligations prior to or when they become due and to fund our expenditures, either through (i) cash on hand, (ii) free cash flow, or (iii) access to the capital or credit markets;

our ability to comply with all covenants in our indentures and credit facilities, any violation of which, if not cured in a timely nobligations under cross-default provisions; and

the risks and uncertainties detailed by Allergan with respect to its business as described in its reports and documents filed with All forward-looking statements attributable to us or any person acting on our behalf are expressly qualified in their entirety by not to place undue reliance on any of these forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements speak only as of the update any of these forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances after the date of this communication or to re-



More Information

Note 1: The guidance in this presentation is only effective as of the date given, April 22, 2014, and will not be updated or affirmed suidance until the Company publicly announces updated or affirmed guidance

Additional Information

This communication does not constitute an offer to buy or solicitation of an offer to sell any securities. This communication re Valeant has made to Allergan stockholders. The exchange offer is being made pursuant to a tender offer statement on Schedule exchange, the letter of election and transmittal and other related offer materials) and a registration statement on Form S-4 filed

June 18, 2014. These materials, as they may be amended from time to time, contain important information, including the term addition, Valeant has filed a preliminary proxy statement with the SEC on June 24, 2014, Pershing Square has filed a definitive SEC on July 11, 2014, and Valeant and Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P. (Pershing Square) (and, if a negotiated to may file one or more additional proxy statements or other documents with the SEC. This communication is not a substitute for registration statement, prospectus or other document Valeant, Pershing Square and/or Allergan have filed or may file with the proposed transaction. INVESTORS AND SECURITY HOLDERS OF VALEANT AND ALLERGAN ARE URGED TO REASTATEMENT, REGISTRATION STATEMENT, AND ANY OTHER DOCUMENTS FILED WITH THE SEC CAREFULL THEY BECOME AVAILABLE AS THEY WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROPOSED TO statement(s) (if and when available) will be mailed to stockholders of Allergan and/or Valeant, as applicable. Investors and sec copies of the tender offer statement, the registration statement and other documents (if and when available) filed with the SEC Square through the web site maintained by the SEC at http://www.sec.gov.

Consent was not obtained or sought with respect to third party statements referenced in this presentation.

Information regarding the names and interests in Allergan and Valeant of Valeant and persons related to Valeant who may be a solicitation of Allergan or Valeant shareholders in respect of a Valeant proposal for a business combination with Allergan is as proxy soliciting materials in respect of Allergan filed with the SEC by Valeant on April 21, 2014 and May 28, 2014. Informat interests in Allergan and Valeant of Pershing Square and persons related to Pershing Square who may be deemed participants in Valeant shareholders in respect of a Valeant proposal for a business combination with Allergan is available in additional definitive proxy soliciting material referred to in the of charge from the sources indicated above.

Non-GAAP Information

To supplement the financial measures prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), the Commeasures that exclude certain items. Management uses non-GAAP financial measures internally for strategic decision making, evaluating current performance. By disclosing non-GAAP financial measures, management intends to provide investors with a comparison of the Company s core operating results and trends for the periods presented. Non-GAAP financial measures are a GAAP; therefore, the information is not necessarily comparable to other companies and should be considered as a supplement superior to, the corresponding measures calculated in accordance with GAAP. The Company has provided preliminary results GAAP financial measures. The Company has not provided a reconciliation of these preliminary and forward-looking non-GAAP difficulty in forecasting and quantifying the exact amount of the items excluded from the non-GAAP financial measures that we GAAP financial measures. Reconciliations of historical non-GAAP financials can be found at www.valeant.com

Agenda

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Executive Summary

ΙT

Overview of Valeant

III.

Overview of the Transaction

IV.

Why a Special Meeting is Needed

V

Conclusion

VI.

Appendix

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

Allergan Stockholders Deserve to be Heard

Valeant s offer is \$72 in cash and 0.83 of a Valeant share providing Allergan stockholders a compelling premium of approximately 50% to the unaffected stock price, an implied LTM EBITDA multiple of approximately 23x

(1)and an implied P/E multiple of 31x 2014 earnings (2) Valeant s offer is the result of meetings with and direct feedback from most of Allergan s major institutional stockholders Allergan s board has refused any engagement with Valeant, has adopted and is enforcing non-stockholder friendly structural defenses, as recognized by many institutional investors along with **ISS** and Glass Lewis, acting to limit stockholders rights, and is taking scorched earth approach, attacking Valeant s business model and business performance with false and misleading information, and in turn hurting both Valeant and Allergan stockholders. We believe Allergan stockholders should have a voice on both eliminating the non-stockholder friendly structural defenses of Allergan, along with evaluation of the Valeant offer, and that

there are significant risks and uncertainties associated with Allergan continuing to delay.
If
stockholders
request
Special
Meeting,
Allergan
should
call
it
immediately,
and
not
delay
for
120 days.

We are Asking for Your Support in Calling a Special Meeting

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Based on Valeant share price of \$121.71 as of close on 16 July 2014; Allergan unaffected share price of \$116.63 as of 10 Apri Pershing Square crossed the 5% Schedule 13D ownership level

Capital IQ Thomson Estimates; FY2014 Allergan Median Consensus EPS estimate as at 16 July 2014

(1)

(2)

Note

Situation Overview (1/2)
Valeant s
offer
is
compelling
and
reflects
direct

feedback from Allergan stockholders \$72 in cash and 0.83 of Valeant share (\$172.50 per share as of July 14, 2014) (1) Based on Valeant s current stock price, the offer represents a compelling approximate 50% premium to Allergan s unaffected share price of \$116.63 on April 10, an implied LTM EBITDA multiple of 23x, and an implied P/E multiple of 31x 2014 earnings (2) With certainty of a transaction, we believe that Valeant stock will increase and hence, significantly increase the value of the offer Pershing Square, Allergan s largest stockholder with 9.7% of shares outstanding, supports the acquisition and has agreed to take all stock at a discount to allow Valeant to increase the value delivered to Allergan s other stockholders, and demonstrates their belief

in the value of our currency and the value of the combined company Allergan s board and management have repeatedly refused to engage in discussions with Valeant about a transaction and has worked to mislead stockholders about Valeant by releasing numerous false and misleading statements about the Valeant business and business model Allergan s board has not been stockholder friendly by taking actions to impede the rights of Allergan stockholders and block them from voicing their perspectives on this offer, specifically by: hiding behind onerous bylaws related to the mechanics of a special meeting, adopting a 10% poison pill, failing to clarify solicitation rules until sued in a Delaware court, and ignoring stockholder proposals Based on Valeant share price of \$121.71 as of close on 16 July 2014 Capital IQ Thomson Estimates; FY2014 Allergan Median Consensus EPS estimate as at 16 July 2014 Note (1) (2)

Situation Overview (2/2)

We believe that calling a special meeting in the very near future is the only path to provide stockholders

with

the

opportunity

to

provide

meaningful input on this transaction in timely manner in order to maximize the present value of the transaction without the uncertainty of waiting until the 2015 annual meeting Special meeting is required to: Revise current Allergan bylaws which significantly inhibits stockholders from exercising their right to call special meeting due to a number of onerous

requirements,

including: holding of shares, reporting all trades, and a 25% threshold, which is higher than the 10% requested by stockholders Address the transaction in a timely manner: if left to an annual meeting, Allergan could delay the annual meeting out to the 3 rd quarter of 2015; as it stands, Allergan can already delay the special meeting to the fourth quarter this year, nine months after our initial offer We are looking for support to call a special meeting in order to: Give a voice to stockholders on Valeant's offer stockholders should

not

have to wait until

the next annual meeting, which could be delayed to the third quarter of 2015.

Remove the majority of current Allergan board members to ensure better governance and engagement

Revise current Allergan bylaws which impede the rights of Allergan stockholders Have the new board evaluate our offer for Allergan

II. OVERVIEW OF VALEANT 9

Valeant Operating Principles

Put patients and our customers first by maintaining the highest ethical standards in the industry

Select high-growth business segments (therapeutic areas and geographies) where the healthcare professional is still the primary decision maker

Maintain a bias toward durable products that are largely cash pay, or are reimbursed through private insurance

Focus our resources on bringing new products to the market (output), not R&D spend

(input)
Maintain
a
decentralized
operating
model
to
ensure
decisions
are
made
close
to
the

Focus our promotional spending on customer-facing activities

customer

Measure all of our operating units on organic growth and cash flow generation

Require Internal Rates of Return (IRR) significantly above our cost of capital, coupled with short-term cash paybacks for all of our deals

Directly link senior management compensation to long-term stockholder returns Ensure tight controls and rigorous compliance standards while avoiding overspending 10

Key Attributes of Valeant s Business Model

Decentralized model delivers strong organic growth (averaged 7% Pro Forma organic growth since 2010)

Value added M&A with a history of maintaining or accelerating revenue growth for nearly all platform acquisitions

All deals targeting 20%+ IRRs and short payback periods

Bausch + Lomb organic growth accelerated from 4% (pre-acquisition) to 10%+ (post acquisition), predominately on volume

All other major platform deals experienced material acceleration in organic growth since acquisition Commitment to innovation through output-driven R&D approach Delivering 19 new product launches in 2014 (>350 if including BGx), on a disciplined R&D budget more than the majority of our competitors and Allergan Rich late-stage pipeline of 300+ assets driven by a balanced approach of internal product development, lifecycle management, BGx development, late-stage inlicensing, and late-stage/pre-launch product acquisition Attractive product and payor mix 85% durable products portfolio

75% cash/privately reimbursed

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Focusing on R&D Output Rather than Input
Traditional Big Pharma input-driven
approach
Focus on shots on goal
Higher spend levels assumed to
generate more new products
Incentives linked to investment levels
High fixed cost/in-house model

All capabilities in-house Staff for peak workloads Valeant s output focused approach Focus on productivity

outputs measured against inputs Lower risk projects Decentralization helps ensure right products for right markets Focus on line extensions and new indications Portfolio prioritization via rigorous, unbiased peer scientific review Leveraging industry capacity Outsourcing commodity services Staff for base needs, outsource for peak workloads With overall industry R&D productivity steadily declining, traditional bets on R&D are unlikely to pay off 12

Valeant 2014 U.S. Launch Products
Peak Sales of \$1.3\$2.3 Billion
Product
Description
Source
Est. peak sales (\$M)
Bensal HP®

Luzu® Topical antifungal for athlete s foot Medicis 50-75 Neotensil Topical product for under-eye bags Partnered from Living Proof 80-100 Obagi360 System Skincare kit for women in their $30 \, s$ In-house 10-30 Retin-A Micro® .08% Topical treatment for acne In-house 20-30 **Jublia®** Topical antifungal for onychomycosis In-house 300-800 **Ideal Implants** Breast implant Partnered from Ideal Implant 25-75 Hyaluronic acid for lips Small particle filler Medicis 20-30 Onexton Topical treatment for acne In-house 50-75 enVista inserter (lens) Further enhancements Bausch + Lomb 40-50 PureVision2 for Presbyopia Daily contact lens Bausch + Lomb

Dermatitis, wound healing Partnered from SMG

25-75

Bausch + Lomb 100-200 Ultra Silicone hydrogel monthly lens Bausch + Lomb 300-400 BioTrue® multifocal Daily contact lens Bausch + Lomb 60-80 Trulign expanded ranges (lens) Broader range of powers Bausch + Lomb 40-60 CeraVe® baby line OTC moisturizer In-house 15-20 Peroxiclear Peroxide based contact lens solution Bausch + Lomb 50-70 Ossix® Plus Dental membrane Partnered from Datum Dental 10-20 **Onset®** Dental analgesic Acquired from Onset 40-50 Total \$1,255M-2,270M Source: Valeant management estimates

20-30 Victus

13

enhancements

Multiple enhancements

Based on projected 2014 revenues excluding Aesthetic Injectables

1

Includes contact lens, surgical, aesthetic devices

Asia

Latin

America

Central &

Eastern

Europe/
Middle East/
Africa
United
States
Canada /
Australia
By Geography
By Business
47%
21%
11%
7%
7%
17%
19%
43%
17%
Devices
1
Gx/BGx
OTC /
Solutions
Rx
11%
Western
Europe
Emerging Markets = ~27%
Highly Diversified Business Portfolio
14

Strong Growth Platforms
Developed Markets
Emerging Markets
Derm Rx
Consumer
Eye Health
Dental

Latin America

Brazil

Mexico

EMEA

Russia/ CIS

Poland

Turkey

Middle East

Asia/South Africa

China

Vietnam

Indonesia

South Africa

Aesthetics

Neuro & Other

15

Firm
Analyst
Report Title
Selected Broker Commentary
Aegis
Raghuram
Selvaraju
Jubilant over Jublia U.S. Approval

Jun 9, 2014

regardless of whether VRX succeeds in acquiring AGN, the VRX business model remains valid and the firm can continue to drive growth near-term

BMO

Alex Arfaei

Will Likely Go the Distance with AGN;

But Should Gain More Support

Jun

10, 2014

we are surprised

by some of the arguments made in Allergan's slide presentation. [] Given the stock s reaction following Valeant's offers, we believe **most investors would disagree**. We **also disagree** with Allergan's characterizations of Valeant's business

Cantor

Fitzgerald

Irina

Rivkind

Koffler

We Like Standalone Business, with AGN Upside; Maintain Buy, Increase

PT to \$209

Jun 2, 2014

CIBC

Stephanie

Price

Growth On Steroids: Initiating Coverage At Sector Outperformer

May 8, 2014

Valeant has a **strong track record of creating value** by acquiring firms with solid product portfolios and investing only in late-stage/low-risk R&D. Management **has proven that M&A** can **lead to better returns** than early stage R&D given Valeant's ability to strip out costs

Guggenheim

Louise

Chen

1Q14 Beat and Raise Quarter

Underscores Earnings Power of

VRX's Business Model

May 8, 2014

We **remain positive** on VRX because of the **durable nature of its diversified business model**. VRX reported strong sales growth and profitability across all regions.

Jefferies

David

Steinberg

Disrupting the Specialty Pharma

Business Model; Assuming at Buy

Apr 21, 2014

Investing community is highly supportive of Valeant business model and performance

~ 1,100%

price

adjusted

increase in Valeant share price since 2008 (1) 90% of analysts have a Buy or Overweight rating (2) Current price target \$168 share (2) Goldman Sachs, Allergan s financial advisor, price target prior to offer was \$164 / share (3)We re increasing our revenue and EPS estimates, and our 12-month target [] as we have greater confidence in the growth potential of the base business []. For a company not known for focusing on R&D, it is worth noting a number of new product launches and pipeline products in attractive categories that could help organic growth down the road. (4)Street Highly Supportive of Valeant s Business Model 16 Notes (1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
We don't think that Valeant promotionally starves its brands, but rather makes selective investments in
highest
value
programs
the
roll-up
strategy
is
difficult,
and
Valeant's
execution
know-how
and experience
is an intangible asset that will continue to drive value
an
attribute
that
is
often
overlooked
is
product
and
geographic
selection.
Valeant
is
where
others
aren't . [] As such, we believe longer term organic growth may be more durable than perceived .
Adjusted for Valeant / Biovail merger
Per Bloomberg 16 July 2014
Goldman Sachs Equity Research price target prior to initial proposal

Per Goldman Sachs Report, 28 February 2014

Despite Allergan Assertions our Model has Delivered Huge Value for Our Stockholders

17

Total Return Analysis since 2008

(1)

(2)

1082%

212%

180% 88% 59% 45% 32% Valeant Apple Allergan Google S&P 500 Index Berkshire Hathaway

Index

Peer Group

Notes

(1)

Total return analysis per Bloomberg based on a start date of 2 January 2008 to unaffected share prices of Valeant and Allergan 10 April 2014 the day before Pershing Square crossed the 5% schedule 13D ownership level

(2)

Peer Group per Valeant s Company Filings (Actavis, Biogen, Perrigo, Mylan, Celgene, Gilead, Vertex, Amgen, Bristol Myers Forest, Shire, Allergan, Danaher, Eli Lilly). Peer Group Index performance calculated as average of its constituents

Bausch + Lomb, a Blueprint for Allergan
History
Acquired B&L on August 6
th
2013
Have almost 1 year of operating performance to date
Owned by Warburg Pincus, who acquired the company in 2007
Prior to acquisition growth was ~4%

Valeant Acquisition
Initially identified \$800M in cost synergies, which has since been upped to \$900M (~60% of standalone company OPEX)
Applied Valeant s decentralized operating model to centralized
Bausch + Lomb structure
Most cuts were from non-customer facing roles
Since acquisition growth has accelerated to double digits every quarter
In Q2 growth has accelerated to 12% through decentralized structure and continued investment in sales, marketing, and medical activities
Continue to fund all major R&D programs, which will drive continued organic growth for years to come

Bausch + Lomb Was A More Complex Integration Than Allergan Would Be Number of employees 13,000 11,400 Manufacturing plants (primary)

14 6

Revenues in

North America

41%

66%

Revenues in

Emerging Markets

~25%

~17%

SKUs

200,000

Far fewer

19

20
Most Reductions (40%) Were to Bausch + Lomb s Non-Customer Facing Functions
B+L CEO
% Reduction
to B+L personnel
US Commercial
9%

Consolidated and leaned parallel commercial teams (Pharma, Surgical, Vision Care) and large Commercial Operations staff (6%)

Reduced marketing management (3%)

Europe

19%

Consolidated commercial teams (10%)

Eliminated redundant regional HQ and country-level G&A (6%)

Consolidated country-level Ops and R&D (3%)

Latin America

33%

Consolidated commercial teams (14%)

Eliminated redundant G&A (10%)

Consolidated country-level functional leaders in Ops and R&D (9%)

Asia

6%

Eliminated redundant G&A

Canada

14%

Consolidated commercial teams (10%)

Eliminated duplicate G&A and functional leaders (4%)

Global Supply

Chain

3%

Eliminated global infrastructure creating one size fits all

policies and pushing all

products to all markets

Global R&D +

Quality

23%

Eliminated high-risk projects, increased use of outsourcing, and eliminated redundant leadership in 3 parallel R&D organizations (17%)

Consolidated country-level personnel (6%)

Corporate

Center

Leaned Finance, IT, Legal, HR, Global Marketing and Corporate Communications teams (60%)

Consolidated G&A from parallel global BUs (Pharma, Surgical, Vision Care) (6%)

66%

Actions taken

21
Bausch + Lomb Pipeline Update
Project
Status/Development
Pharmaceuticals
Brimonidine
Recent completion of Phase 3 studies, planned NDA submission

Lotemax Gel Next Gen

Recent completion of positive Phase 3 study

Latanoprostene bunod

Phase 3 enrollment complete

Mimetogen

Awaiting analysis of Phase 2 data

Contact Lens

Ultra

Successful approval, US launch underway, Anticipated approval

and launches of Ultra Toric and Multifocal lenses

Biotrue

Approval of multifocal contact lens

Surgical

EnVista

Toric IOL in Phase 3 development

Victus

US fragmentation approval and launch; improvements to

software and hardware

Trulign

Development of expanded ranges

Stellaris PC

New packs, retina products, and enhancements

Cirle

Investment in surgical navigation system

Consumer

Peroxiclear

Successful approval and launch

Soothe XP

Re-launching product

Update on Bausch + Lomb Q2 Performance (1)

Consumer

RX Pharma

Surgical

Contact Lens

Generics

Emerging Markets

Other Developed Markets

Organic Growth:

Q2 2014/Q2 2013

22

14%

8%

14%

United States

12%

17%

12%

38%

3%

Country/Region

Notes

(1)

Total

12%

~90% of growth in the U.S. was from volume

Preliminary Estimates

>90% of the growth on a global basis was from volume

Bausch + Lomb Performance Acquisition through Q2 2014

(1)

Consumer

RX Pharma

Surgical

Contact Lens

Generics

Emerging Markets

Other Developed Markets

Organic Growth

since acquisition

23

13%

10%

13%

United States

12%

11%

11%

12%

29%

Country/Region

Notes

(1)

Total

11%

~90% of growth in the U.S. was from volume

Preliminary Estimates

>90% of the growth on a global basis was from volume

III. COMPELLING STRATEGIC AND FINANCIAL TRANSACTION FOR ALLERGAN STOCKHOLDERS 24

Compelling Strategic & Financial Transaction for Allergan Stockholders
Significant immediate value to Allergan stockholders
Each Allergan share receives \$72 in cash and 0.83 Valeant shares
Approximate
50%
premium

to

the

unaffected stock price, an implied **EBITDA** multiple of approximately 23x (1) and an implied P/E multiple of 31x 2014 earnings (2) Allergan ownership of 44% of pro forma entity Open to providing a contingent value right for DARPin in a negotiated transaction We believe that the Valeant stock price, and value of the offer, will increase certainty of transaction increases Sustainable long-term value to stockholders Unrivaled portfolio in Ophthalmology, Dermatology, Aesthetics, and Neurology Robust combined company product pipeline Valeant strength in emerging markets to drive future growth, as seen in Bausch & Lomb \$2.7B+ in annual operating cost synergies and additional significant revenue and tax synergies, supporting meaningful earnings accretion Valeant intends to initiate \$0.20 / share annual

dividend

equal
to
current
Allergan
dividend
Allergan s
largest
stockholder,
Pershing
Square,
has
elected
to
take
all
stock
at
a
substantial
discount
based on current prices
Pershing Square is confident in our currency and the value of the combined entity
Allows Valeant to offer more cash to Allergan stockholders
Other than the antitakeover devices that can be removed by the Allergan board, no substantive hurdles to closing
No financing contingency; committed financing in place
Divested aesthetics business
Valeant will accept antitrust risk
Flexible with any and all social issues
All other conditions are customary and should easily be satisfied
25
Note
Based on Valeant share price of \$121.71 as of close on 16 July 2014; Allergan unaffected share price of \$116.63
as of 10 April 2014, the day before Pershing Square crossed the 5% Schedule 13D ownership level
Capital IQ Thomson Estimates; FY2014 Allergan Median Consensus EPS estimate as at 16 July 2014
(1)
(2)

26
Valeant + Allergan
A Perfect Strategic Combination
Dermatology &
Aesthetics
Ophthalmology
Consumer
Neuro. &

Urology Emerging markets Combined company with 14 late stage pipeline programs with \$4B+ in potential annual peak sales Note (1) are approximated Therapeutic area revenue estimates exclude revenue from emerging markets.

Revenue estimates

Valeant + Allergan, an Unrivaled Platform for Growth and Value Creation in Healthcare

(1)

Note

(1)

Valeant +Allergan

2014E rev

5 year market

growth rate Source: IMS, EvaluatePharma Therapeutic area revenue estimates exclude revenue from emerging markets. Revenue estimates are approximated Ophthalmology Dermatology Rx Aesthetics Consumer Neurology/Dental/Other **Emerging Markets** \$3.8B 6-7% \$1.5B 6-7% \$2.1B 11-12%

\$1.3B 6-7% \$2.8B 4-6% \$3.8B 10-13%

Valeant
Allergan
Benefits of Valeant Model
Emerging
Market (EM)
Focus
Significant EM presence with field
sales force to drive growth

Strong branded generics / OTC portfolio with 55% annual growth in EM Continue to utilize distributors in some markets 11% annual growth in EM Ability to leverage direct EM sales force to sell branded generics Commercial Direct customer-facing promotion (70% total headcount) Heavy investment in marketing Clear ROI and value of dollars spent Organization Decentralized, local, empowered business owners (SG&A equal to 22% of sales in 2013) Rapid-decision making at local / customer level Centralized, global & regional organizations Heavy corporate focus and spend (SG&A equal to 38% of sales in 2013) Gold-plated approach Quicker, better-informed decisions made close to the customer Small, lean and focused corporate center Capital Allocation Low risk, in-line and late-stage assets Strict price discipline

History of successful M&A Higher-risk, earlier-stage

assets

Less sensitive to price paid

Mixed M&A track-record

Higher returns on capital and

faster paybacks

Easier to understand success and

track record

R&D

Low-risk, late-stage projects (line-

extensions)

Robust pipeline from internal &

external sources

2

3% of revenue

Early-stage, risky programs

(limited success; 35 failures since

1998)

Similar emphasis on line-

extensions but at ~4-5x the cost

Low-risk investments (eliminates

risky

early

stage

research)

Focus on outputs

Operating Model Differences Create Opportunity for Synergies

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Opportunity to Drive Significant Value From Synergies Annual cost synergy opportunity of \$2.7 billion + tax + revenue synergy Value Source of Synergy SG&A Synergies ~\$1,800 million

(40% reduction of

combined SG&A)

Rationalize US & Corporate HQ

Eliminate regional HQ

Decentralize organization by eliminating unnecessary global functions

Reduce duplicate external spend

Align to Valeant advertising and promotion model and spend

Maintain strong field force presence

R&D Cost

Synergy

~\$900 million

(69% reduction of

combined R&D)

Apply Valeant approach to on-going R&D

Focus on output not input

Target low-risk projects

Continue high-probability programs such as line extensions

Continue to in-license late stage/launch products (e.g. Emerade,

Neotensil, Luzu)

Rationalize core R+D infrastructure

Tax Synergy

Revenue Synergy

Valeant has a proven track record in achieving or surpassing announced synergies 29

Combined high single-digit tax rate

Acceleration of Allergan in emerging markets

Acceleration of Allergan OTC

Acceleration of Valeant Aesthetic assets ex-US

Additional product growth opportunities

+\$72

per


share

in cash

Allergan Stockholders

Assumes reinvestment of \$72 in Valeant stock at \$117.75 share price as of June 16th close Based on mid-point of guidance

Which Supports Significant Earnings Accretion for Both
Sets of Stockholders, and
(1)
30
\$5.68
(2)
\$5.68
(2)
\$8.68
(2)
\$9.00
\$15.65
\$10.85
Allergan based on .83
exchange
Allergan based on .83
exchange and reinvesting
cash in VRX
Valeant stockholder
2014
Pro Forma 2014
58%
Accretion
176%
Accretion
25%
Accretion
(1)
(2)
Notes



This value is for illustrative purposes only and is not a prediction of a future trading price; the actual future trading price may be

Pro

Forma

2014

EPS

=

\$10.85;

Management

estimate, Valeant June presentation Illustrative, based on blended Unaffected 2014 P / E Multiple = 16.8x; Management estimate, Valeant May 28th presentation Exchange Ratio Valeant Stock Price .83 \$122 Per Share Cash Consideration Per Share Equity Consideration Total \$72 \$101 \$173 \$10.85 (2) x 16.8x P/E (3) = \$182 per share Current See Through Value .83 \$182 \$72 \$151 \$223 Indicative Trading Value (1) Valeant Closing Price July 16, 2014 A Compelling Valuation for Allergan Stockholders, that 31 **Equity Consideration** Calculation (1) (2) Notes (3)

nd

```
Implied
Standalone
Allergan
2015
P
/
E
Multiples
```

Post-Bid EPS
(4)
\$116.63 as of 10 April 2014, the day before Pershing Square crossed the 5% Schedule 13D ownership level
This value is for illustrative purposes only and is not a prediction of a future trading price; the actual future trading price may be
Capital IQ Thomson Estimates; FY2015 Allergan Median Consensus EPS estimate as at 10 April 2014 ~\$6.21
Capital IQ Thomson Estimates; FY2015 Allergan Median Consensus EPS estimate as at 16 July 2014 ~\$6.94
+91%
32
(1)
(2)
Allergan Unaffected
Stock Price
Current "See Through"
Value
Indicative
Trading Value
+48%
18.8x
16.8x
27.9x
24.9x
36.0x
32.2x
Represents a Significant Premium to Allergan s
Unaffected Trading Levels, and
(1)
(2)
Notes
(3)
(4)
\$117
\$173
\$223

Pre-Bid EPS

(3)

Compares Favorably to Precedent M&A Transactions Notes Premium to Unaffected Trading Price AV / LTM EBITDA Acquisition Multiples

(4)

(4)

33

Thomson Reuters Database. Median premium paid to target s unaffected trading price 1-day prior to announcement or event. last 12 months, where transaction value was above \$1Bn and cash was included in the deal

This value is for illustrative purposes only and is not a prediction of a future trading price; the actual future trading price may be Based on selected pharmaceutical M&A transactions over \$15Bn in the last 10 years: Actavis / Forest Laboratories, Abbvie / Schering,

Merck

/

Schering-Plough

and

Pfizer

/

Wyeth.

Data

sourced

from

Company

filings

and

FactSet

as

of

16 July

2014.

Implied

aggregate

value

/

LTM

EBITDA

are

based on unaffected prices and pro forma for announced acquisitions

Allergan 31 March 2014 LTM EBITDA of \$2.259Bn per company filings; defined as non-GAAP operating income plus depre This value is for illustrative purposes only and is not a prediction of a future trading price; the actual future trading price may be

- (1)
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (1) (2)
- (3)

Median Premium

Paid in US M&A

Transactions

During Last

Twelve Months

(\$1Bn and Higher)

Based on

Current "See Through

Value"

Based on

Indicative

Trading Value

Based on

Current "See

Through Value"

Based on Indicative

Trading Value

Median for

Precedent Selected

Pharmaceutical

Transactions

Indicative Trading Value AGN (1)
\$223 per share
Current See Through
Value AGN \$173 per share
(2)

- (6)
- (5)

As Well As Other Pricing Reference Points

(3)

Trading Reference Points

Price Targets From

Allergan s Advisers

- (9)
- (4)
- (8)
- 34
- \$125
- \$132
- \$117
- \$131
- \$126
- \$127
- \$125
- \$130

Goldman Sachs

Price Target Prior to

Valeant's Offer

BAML Price

Target Prior to

Valeant's Offer

AGN Unaffected

Share Price

AGN Unaffected

All-Time Trading High

Illustrative AGN

Price Adjusted for

S&P 500 Return

Illustrative AGN Price

Adjusted for Proxy

Peers

Return

Illustrative AGN Price

Adjusted for S&P 1500

Pharmaceuticals

Index Return

Illustrative AGN Price

Adjusted for Street

Revised 2015 EPS

Notes

- (1)
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)

- (6)
- (7)
- (8)
- (9)

This value is for illustrative purposes only and is not a prediction of a future trading price; the actual future trading price may be Goldman Sachs Equity Research price target prior to initial proposal

BAML Equity Research price target prior to initial proposal

Unaffected share prices as of 10 April 2014, the day before Pershing Square crossed the 5% schedule 13D ownership level Per Bloomberg; 19 March 2014

Allergan share price on 10 April 2014 adjusted for S&P 500 performance through to 16 July 2014

Allergan share price on 10 April 2014 through to 16 July 2014 adjusted for peers from Allergan proxy statement dated 26 Mar Allergan share price on 10 April 2014 adjusted for S&P 1500 Pharmaceuticals Index performance through to 16 July 2014

Pre-bid P / E multiple calculated using Capital IQ Thomson estimates as of 10 April 2014 applied to current Capital IQ EPS es (7)

IV. WHY A SPECIAL MEETING IS NEEDED 35

In April, Valeant made a public acquisition proposal to buy Allergan for \$48.30 in cash and 0.83 of a Valeant share for each Allergan share, representing a substantial premium over Allergan s unaffected stock price Valeant met with most of Allergan s major institutional stockholders

Based on feedback received from Allergan stockholders, Valeant revised its offer to \$58.30 in cash, representing an

increase

of

\$10,

or approximately 21%, of cash consideration, and 0.83 of a Valeant share Pershing Square engaged further with several of Allergan s largest stockholders and received feedback that if Valeant raised its offer to \$180 in value per share (based on the trading price at that time of Valeant stock), they would be supportive of the transaction Valeant subsequently launched an exchange offer to take the bid to Allergan stockholders due to the structural defenses adopted by Allergan s incumbent board, stockholders are unable exchange their shares Allergan remains unwilling

to

engage in discussions about the benefits of a proposed combination as a result, Valeant and Pershing Square have decided to put the decision directly in the hands of Allergan stockholders Valeant Has Presented a Compelling Offer Allergan Has Refused to Engage or Allow Stockholders a Voice 36 Note (1)(2) Based on this further feedback, Valeant and Pershing Square restructured their arrangement to materially increase the value and cash component to Allergan s non-affiliated stockholders In response, Valeant s board approved raising the offer to \$72.00 in cash and 0.83 Valeant shares an approximate 50% premium to the unaffected stock price,

an implied **EBITDA** multiple of approximately 23x (1) and an implied P/E multiple of 31x 2014 earnings (2)

Based on Valeant share price of \$121.71 as of close on 16 July 2014; Allergan unaffected share price of \$116.63 as of 10 Apri before Pershing Square crossed the 5% Schedule 13D ownership level

Capital IQ Thomson Estimates; FY2014 Allergan Median Consensus EPS estimate as at 16 July 2014

May
13:
Pershing
Square
attempts to have a discussion with
Mr. Pyott regarding the rejection
of
the

Valeant proposal; Mr. **Pyott** does not respond to substantive questions and refuses a request for a call between Pershing Square and independent directors Feb 10 14: Mr. **Pyott** conducted sessions with research analysts where he made statements indicating that Allergan and its stockholders were not interested in a combination with Valeant May 12: Despite having no substantive discussions with Valeant or its advisors, Allergan s board rejects the acquisition proposal April 23-24: Allergan refuses Pershing Square s request for a call with Michael Gallagher,

Allergan s

Lead Independent Director, and instead provides a call with Mr. Gallagher, Mr. Pyott and other Allergan executives; during the call, Mr. Gallagher refuses a request for a call without Allergan management present April 21: Pershing Square announces its 9.7% position in Allergan, making it Allergan s largest stockholder, and Valeant announces its acquisition proposal; within hours, Allergan adopts a poison pill with a 10% ownership trigger Timeline of Valeant s Efforts and Allergan s Responses Feb 6: After outreach by Mr. Pearson, Mr. Pyott agreed to meet to discuss a potential combination of Allergan and Valeant May 29: At the Sanford Bernstein Strategic Decisions Conference in NYC, several of Allergan s largest stockholders expressed to Pershing Square their support for a merger between Allergan and Valeant, particularly if the offer increased to \$180 in value per share May 27:

Despite

having conducted no thorough due diligence on Valeant, Allergan s management makes a public presentation criticizing Valeant s business model and team; many of the assertions contained in the presentation are factually incorrect May 30: In response Allergan stockholders feedback, Valeant increases its bid by [23]%; in connection with the increase, Pershing Square agrees to the restructuring of its agreement (including taking less consideration and all stock) June 10: After announcing publicly on May 27 that Allergan would likely not be willing to negotiate with Valeant, Allergan rejects Valeant s revised proposal (and, on June 24, the subsequently announced exchange offer) June

13:

Pershing Square is forced to pursue litigation after Allergan refuses to clarify that stockholders attempting to exercise their special meeting right will not trigger Allergan s poison pill June 27: Allergan settles the Pershing Square suit, acknowledging that stockholders attempting to exercise their right to call a special meeting will not trigger the poison pill Based on Historical Conduct, in the Absence of a Stockholder Forum Allergan s Incumbent Board is Unlikely to Engage 2012: Mike Pearson of Valeant approached David Pyott of Allergan, regarding a potential combination transaction; Mr. Pyott indicated the Allergan board was not interested at the time Note Other than the 2012 discussions, all events above occurred in 2014 37 Subsequent to the sessions, Sanford Bernstein and Bank of America Merrill Lynch (subsequently engaged as an advisor to Allergan) published reports including Mr. Pyott s statements These statements preempted

the

meeting

between

Mr.

Pyott

and

Mr.

Pearson,

and

it

was

cancelled

Allergan s Board Has Been Focused on Obstructing
Stockholder Input Rather than Constructively Engaging
Since Valeant's initial proposal, the Allergan board has responded by adopting structural defenses, limiting stockholder rights and refusing to engage, including:
Immediately adopting
a
poison

89

pill with a 10% trigger threshold, which prevents stockholders from taking advantage of our exchange offer Quick to clarify that stockholders can remove but not replace directors at a special meeting, but did not clarify that stockholders attempts to call special meeting would not trigger the poison pill until litigation was pursued Attacking Valeant s business model and business performance, the value of our currency and the capabilities of our leadership team, with assertions that have been proven factually incorrect Deferring all matters of the Valeant offer to the Chairman & **CEO** as the sole point

of contact with Valeant and Pershing Square this is the same executive who the majority of Allergan stockholders voted to strip of the Chairman role Allergan ignored its own guidelines by refusing to allow many stockholders to meet separately with Mr. Gallagher the same director they appointed to discuss the transaction and against whom one-third Allergan stockholders voted against, and ISS and Glass Lewis recommended against in 2014 Refusing to engage in any discussions related to our offer and attacked our business model and business performance without any due diligence on our business Lobbying government officials and physicians against the deal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38

Allergan Management Approach
Refusing to evaluate our offer
Has attacked our business model without any factual basis
Has not done any direct due diligence with Valeant, whose stock constitutes a majority of its offer
Has made false and misleading statements about our business model and business performance
Proposing an implausible standalone plan

Allergan's plan is in direct response to Valeant's offer and lacks credibility Provided a plan for future cost containment Have no track record of cost reduction Continue to raise future earnings estimates: Q4 2013 earnings call: growth of between 12% and 15%, which is consistent with our aspiration of mid-teens EPS growth. May 2014 special call: [we believe] we can achieve EPS growth of 20%

on a compound annual basis over the next five years.
Allergan has now suggested they will further revise guidance
39

Allergan is Making False and Misleading Statements Allergan Assertions:

40

Top 10 markets: China, Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico, Poland, Turkey, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia 13 of the top 15 Valeant products are growing

9 of the 15 are growing by volume

Emerging market growth

in smaller countries with

less revenue potential Bausch & Lomb s outlook is poor Valeant model leads to rapid organic sales decline Bausch & Lomb continues to grow 10%+ year over year Growth predominately from volume, not price Valeant has direct presence in 9 of the top 10 emerging markets, and sales in all 10 markets Over \$200M in sales in 2014 for 5 of the top 6 markets (China, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, and Poland) Delivering double-digit organic revenue growth in 7 of the 9 markets, and over 10% organic growth in aggregate across these markets acquisition (CAGR year of acquisition through 2013) Coria: 27%, Dow: 12%, Aton: 33%, Pharmaswiss: 5%, Sanitas: 5%, OraPharma: 9%, Medicis: 4%, Bausch & Lomb 12% (growth through Q2 2014) Valeant has averaged ~7% pro forma organic growth since 2010 In Q1 2014, quarter over comparable quarter in Q1 2013 Facts: Anemic growth driven by what we believe are unsustainable price increases not volume (1)Notes All platform acquisitions growth has accelerated post

Allergan vs. Valeant governance comparison ISS Quick Score 41
Overall

Board

Shareholder Rights

Compensation

Audit

Source: Yahoo Finance, ISS

Note: the lower scores are better ratings, (1: best, 10: worst)

Allergan s Board is Not Functionally Independent Michael Gallagher is not an effective Lead Director Longest-standing non-management director on the board, having joined in 1998 (shortly after Mr. Pyott joined) Received 33% withhold votes from Allergan stockholders at the 2014 Annual Meeting Limited scope of his lead director role was only enhanced in reaction to stockholder pressure

Refused interactions with Pershing Square, Allergan s largest stockholder, without Mr. Pyott present, which we have been told has been the case for many AGN stockholders ISS and Glass Lewis recommended against Mr. Gallagher in 2014 given the board's failure to fully implement a stockholder proposal that received majority support at the company's 2013 annual meeting. Allergan s Board Structure Provides a Poor Check on Management Interests Long-serving CEO David Pyott dominates the current board in his role as Chairman Joined in 1998 his 16-year tenure is longer than any other director on the board Stockholders voted to remove him from the Chairman role at Allergan s 2014 annual meeting, but he still retains his Chairman position Mr. Pyott s compensation in the past two years alone is comparable to the amount he would receive in a deal Used his role as Chairman to lead all matters relating to Valeant s proposal The Compensation Committee, under the leadership of Mr. Gallagher as Chairman, has designed a compensation structure that enables Mr. **Pyott** to remain highly compensated regardless of value creation for Allergan stockholders Overwhelming majority

of

Mr. Pyott s compensation is delivered via a long-term incentive plan that is benchmarked to the 75th percentile of a peer group, nearly half of which is comprised of companies that are more than 2xAllergan s market cap Mr. Pyott s long-term incentive award is not subject to any performance

metrics and will deliver

value to Mr. Pyott as long as there is any share price increase, even if Allergan underperforms peers 2012 the Compensation Committee used its discretion grant one-time, non-performance based retention grant to Mr. Pyott, who had been in his role for 14 years at the time, valued at \$9.2 A portion of compensation is directly tied to the level of R&D spend, more spending leads to higher pay irrespective of the return on investment

Illustrative Example: Lack of Effective, Independent Oversight of CEO Compensation

Allergan s Board Has History of Not Reacting Without Direct Stockholder Pressure Board Declassification 2011: Stockholder proposal sought declassification of the

board 2011: Allergan sought no action relief from the **SEC** and reacted by declassifying the board Lead Independent Director 2014: Allergan s lead independent director role was described by a proxy advisor as not sufficiently robust to provide an effective counterbalance to Mr. **Pyott** 1 2014: Allergan s board purports to have expanded the role in response to stockholder pressure, although Mr. Pyott appears to continue to dominate the board Stockholder Ability to Call a Special Meeting 2012: Majority supported stockholder proposal to establish

the

right for holders of 10% of stock to call special meeting 2013: Allergan submitted a charter amendment provide holders of 25% of Allergan s stock the right to call special meetings The board unilaterally imposed onerous information and procedural bylaw requirements without reasonable disclosure that make it difficult for stockholders to exercise this right Stockholder Action by Written Consent 2013: Majority supported stockholder proposal to establish the right to act by written consent 2014: Allergan submitted charter

amendment

to provide stockholders the right to act by written consent, but again unilaterally imposed onerous information and procedural requirements without reasonable disclosure making it difficult to exercise this right Separation of Chairman / CEO 2014: Majority supported stockholder proposal to split the Chairman and **CEO** roles of Mr. Pyott Present: Allergan s board has taken no action to date in response to this majority supported proposal Engaging with Valeant Present: Based on our conversations, Allergan stockholders are interested in Allergan having constructive dialogue

with Valeant

Present: Allergan s board continues to reject requests for substantive discussions Partially Ignored Reactive Ignoring Allergan Stockholder Views Allergan s Response Note (1) 43

From 2014 ISS report on Allergan

Allergan has No Experience with Major Restructuring Programs or Large Scale Acquisitions Recent Allergan Statements Lack Credibility
44
Prior to Valeant Offer
Following Valeant Offer
Cost Cutting
EPS Growth

Share

Repurchases M&A

Allergan s Poor Business Development Track Record
Inamed, March 2006, \$3.3Bn
Obesity business sold off for less than 1x sales and an ~80% write-off of book value
Breast aesthetics business has slowed and sales have fallen below expectations

Esprit Pharma, October 2007, \$371MM Peak sales fell ~80% short of expectations

Resulted in write-off of 99.6% of purchase price

DARPin, May 2011, \$420MM (including milestones)
Phase III trial delayed, and no formal timeline for Phase III trial has been

provided

MAP Pharmaceuticals, March 2013, \$871MM

Lead

product

Levadex

has

been

delayed

three

times

and

now

is

not

expected

to

launch until 2015

Since MAP acquisition have acquired an additional company in an attempt to fix ongoing CMC issues

45

Allergan stockholders should have the right to assert their views on the Valeant offer

The existence of a poison pill makes it impossible for Allergan stockholders to take advantage of our exchange offer

This right was only adopted after stockholder pressure Made charter unclear if calling a meeting could trigger Poison Pill (Valeant and Pershing Square were forced to

litigate to clarify)

Developed onerous process which provides significant inconvenience and burden to Allergan stockholders Pershing Square is seeking the support of at least 15.3% of non-affiliated Allergan stockholders to exercise their right to call a special meeting

The special meeting will provide a forum for Allergan stockholders to deliver a clear message regarding their views on the Valeant proposal and the conduct of

Allergan s board

Allergan stockholders will be able to vote on

proposals related to the following:

Removal of 6 of 9 of the incumbent

directors of Allergan

Recommendation of a slate of new

independent directors

Encourage the independent board to

engage in discussions with Valeant

Other positive governance changes,

removing impediments to stockholder

action

A Special Meeting Will Provide Allergan Stockholders With

a Meaningful Voice

The ability to request a special stockholder meeting gives our stockholders a powerful means to consider and approve stockholder-sponsored action and timely effect changes .

Allergan Proxy for the 2014 Annual Meeting, Filed 3/26/2014 46

Stockholders should not have to wait for the next annual meeting, which could be delayed to the third quarter of 2015. The Special Meeting should be called promptly, and not delayed for 120 days

Allergan s charter provides stockholders holding 25% of the stock with the right to call a special meeting Valeant believes that Allergan

stockholder support at the special meeting will deliver a clear message that

Allergan should engage with Valeant

V. CONCLUSION 47

Allergan Stockholders Deserve to be Heard

Valeant s offer is \$72 in cash and 0.83 of a Valeant share providing Allergan stockholders a compelling premium of approximately 50% to the unaffected stock price, an implied LTM EBITDA multiple of approximately 23x

(1)and an implied P/E multiple of 31x 2014 earnings (2) Valeant s offer is the result of meetings with and direct feedback from most of Allergan s major institutional stockholders Allergan s board has refused any engagement with Valeant, has adopted and is enforcing non-stockholder friendly structural defenses, as recognized by many institutional investors along with **ISS** and Glass Lewis, acting to limit stockholders rights, and is taking scorched earth approach, attacking Valeant s business model and business performance with false and misleading information, and in turn hurting both Valeant and Allergan stockholders. We believe Allergan stockholders should have a voice on both eliminating the non-stockholder friendly structural defenses of Allergan, along with evaluation of the Valeant offer, and that

there are significant risks and uncertainties associated with Allergan continuing to delay.

If stockholders request Special Meeting, Allergan should call it

immediately, and not delay for

120 days.

We are Asking for Your Support in Calling a Special Meeting

48

Note

Based on Valeant share price of \$121.71 as of close on 16 July 2014; Allergan unaffected share price of \$116.63 as of 10 Apri Square crossed the 5% Schedule 13D ownership level

Capital IQ Thomson Estimates; FY2014 Allergan Median Consensus EPS estimate as at 16 July 2014

- (1)
- (2)

APPENDIX

50

Cathleen

P.

Black

(70)

Senior

Advisor

at

RRE

Ventures

LLC

Senior Advisor at RRE Ventures LLC, an early stage venture capital firm, since 2011, and has served on the boards of two of RRE Ventures LLC s portfolio companies, Yieldbot Inc. and Bark & Co Inc. She is also a board member of PubMatic, Inc. Previously served as President of Hearst Magazines and also served as a director of the Hearst Corporation from January 1996 until late 2010. Served as President of USA Today from October 1983 until June 1991 and was a board member of the parent company, Gannett Co.

Served as a director of Vibrant Media Inc., a global leader of in-content contextual technology, from October 2012 until 2013, served as an independent director of International Business Machines Corp. from 1995 until 2010, and served as a director of The Coca-Cola Company from 1992 until 2010

Proposed Director Slate (1/2)

Fredric

N.

Eshelman

(65)

Principal

of

Eshelman

Ventures,

LLC

Principal at Eshelman Ventures, LLC, which is a fund that invests primarily in early-stage healthcare

Served as Founding Chairman of Furiex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a drug development company, from its founding in 2009 until the sale of the company to Forest Laboratories LLC in July 2014 for \$1.5 billion. Founded Pharmaceutical Product Development (PPD), an international contract research organization, and served as the CEO of PPD until 1989 and from July 1990 until July 2009, Vice Chairman of its board of directors from July 1993 until July 2009, and Executive Chairman from July 2009 until its sale to private equity in 2011 for \$3.9

billion. From 1989 until 1990, Dr. Eshelman was Senior Vice

President of Development at Glaxo, Inc. and served on the board of the U.S. subsidiary of Glaxo Holdings plc. Currently serves as director on several private company boards. Served on the board of Princeton Pharma Holdings LLC from February 2008 until May 2010, when it was acquired by Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.

Betsy

Atkins

(61)

Chief

Executive

Officer

of

Baja

LLC

CEO of Baja LLC, an independent venture capital firm focused on technology, renewable sciences, and sciences, since 1994 Co-founded several successful high tech and consumer companies, including Ascend Communications, which was sold to Lucent Technologies in 1999 for \$24 billion

Formerly CEO and Chairman of Clear Standards, an on-demand enterprise energy management sustainability software company, from 2008 to 2009, at which time it was acquired by SAP AG. Former Chairman of the Board of Directors of Third Screen Media, a company that was eventually sold to AOL

Has served as a director of Polycom, Inc. since April 1999, Schneider Electric, SA since April 2011, HD Supply Holdings, Inc since September 2013, and Ciber Inc. since July 2014. Formerly served on the Boards of Directors of Human Genome Sciences Inc., HealthSouth Corporation, Vonage Holdings Inc., Towers Watson & Co., Reynolds American Inc., SunPower Corporation, and Chico s FAS, Inc. Has agreed she will remain on only three other boards if elected to Allergan s board

5

Managing Director of Shulman Ventures Inc., a private equity firm, and has been a strategic advisor to Water Street Healthcare Partners, a health care private equity firm, since 2008

Served as Chairman of Health Management Associates Inc. from 2013 until January 2014, and served as Chairman and CEO of Magellan Health Services, Inc. from 2003 until 2009

Founded and was Chairman and CEO at Internet Healthcare Group, LLC, a health care services and technology venture fund, from 1999 until 2003, and served as the Chairman, President and CEO of Prudential Healthcare, Inc. from 1997-1999 Has served as Chairman of CareCentrix, Inc. since 2008, Access MediQuip, LLC since 2009, and Accretive Health, Inc.

since 2014, and has served on numerous privately held company boards

Former President and CEO of the Graduate Management Admission Council, a not-for-profit association dedicated to creating access to graduate management and professional education, a position he held from 1995 until December 2013 Has served as a Director for CoreSite Realty Corporation since 2010 and Barnes & Noble, Inc. since 2010. Served as a Director for Terra Industries, Inc. from 2009 until 2010 and Laureate Education, Inc. from 2002 until 2007.

Worked in various capacities for Ernst & Young LLP from 1978 until 1994. Also held faculty positions at Queen s University from 1968 until 1970, the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign from 1970 until 1972, the University of Texas from 1979 until 1978, and Harvard University s Graduate School of Business from 1976 until 1977

Former Executive Chairman of Univar, Inc., a position he held from May 2012 until December 2012. Served as Director,

President and CEO of Univar, Inc. from 2009 to May 2012. Served as Chairman and **CEO** of Allied Waste Industries. Inc. from 2005 until 2008, at which time Allied Waste Industries, Inc. merged with Republic Services, Inc. Served as Executive VP of ARAMARK Corporation from 2000 until 2004 Has served

as

Director

of

Veritiv

Corporation

since

June

2014,

Reynolds

American

Inc.

since

2007

and

Ecolab

Inc.

since

2006. Has also served as Director of Liberty Capital Partners, Investment Arm, a private equity and venture capital firm specializing in startups, early stage, growth

equity, buyouts, and acquisitions, since June 2004

Proposed Director Slate (2/2)

Steven

J.

Shulman

(63)

Managing

Director

of

Shulman

Ventures,

Inc.

David

A.

Wilson

(73)

Former

President

and

CEO

of

the

Graduate

Management

Admission

Council

John

J.

Zillmer

(58)

Former

President,

CEO

and

Director

of

Univar,

Inc.

Valeant Corporate Governance (1/3)
Provision
Valeant*
Allergan
Stockholder Support Needed to Call a
Special Meeting
5% (BCBCA)
25% (Articles)

Amount of Time Board May Delay Holding a Special Meeting After a Request 4 months (BCBCA) 120 days (Bylaws) Requirements for Stockholders to Call a Special Meeting Must satisfy the basic technical requirements of the BCBCA (which include, among other things, a requirement to state the business to be conducted and obtaining the signature of all the requisitioning shareholders) Must provide detailed Special Meeting Request with information on, among other things, the holder, its holdings, and any Disclosable Interest (as defined in the Bylaws) and a representation that the holder will hold its shares through the date of the meeting (Bylaws) Stockholder Action by Written Consent No specific requirements for requesting a record date, 66 approval is required to pass any matter that would normally require simple majority approval at a general meeting, and unanimous written consent is required for all other resolutions (BCBCA) Permitted if 25% of holders request a record date (by providing similar information required for the calling of a special meeting by shareholders); the shareholder approval necessary to act by written consent would be the same as that required at a meeting of shareholders (Articles) Stockholder Removal of Directors May be removed with % 66 approval (Articles and consistent with BCBCA) May be removed with or without cause by the affirmative

vote of the holders of a majority of the shares then entitled

to vote at an election of directors (Articles) Newly Created Directorships and Vacancies

May be filled by a plurality of shareholders at the meeting in which the director is removed or, if not filled by the shareholders at such meeting, by the shareholders or the remaining directors (BCBCA); directors may make additional appointments of new directors, but additional directors may not exceed one-third of the number of directors elected at the last stockholder meeting (Articles) May be filled solely by the affirmative vote of a majority of the remaining directors (Articles); however, the DGCL also provides that, if the directors then in office constitute less than a majority of the whole Allergan Board, then, upon application by at least 10% of the outstanding shares, the Delaware Court of Chancery may order a stockholder election of directors

Director Nominations

Advance notice requirement, approved by ISS Canada, for director nominations whereby shareholders seeking to nominate candidates must provide timely notice in writing in accordance with the terms of such provision (Articles) Advanced notice requirement for director nominations at annual meetings whereby stockholders seeking to nominate candidates must provide notice, subject to certain exceptions, not more than 60 days and not less than 30 days prior to an annual meeting; requirement to provide certain information on the director nominee and the nominating shareholder (including on stock ownership and any Disclosable Interest) (Articles and Bylaws)

The Valeant Articles were reviewed by ISS Canada in 2013 in connection with Valeant s continuation as a corporation under the BCBCA. ISS Canada recommended approval of the Articles.

52

2 /3

2

/3

Valeant Corporate Governance (2/3)
Provision
Valeant*
Allergan
Interested Stockholder Provision
MI 61-101 Protection of Minority Security
Holders in Special Transactions
(a rule of

Autorité des marchés financiers in Québec) requires, in the context of certain transactions with interested parties (which would include a merger with a 10% shareholder) and subject to certain exceptions, disinterested shareholder approval of the transaction by a simple majority of the disinterested votes cast, a

the Ontario Securities Commission and the

formal valuation and enhanced disclosure If a merger with an interested stockholder (5% or more holder) is not approved by a majority of independent directors, the merger requires the approval of a majority of stockholders other than the interested stockholder (Articles);

Section 203 of the DGCL also prevents an interested stockholder (15% or more) from engaging in a business combination

for three years following the date that person became an interested stockholder, unless (1) the board

approves the transaction in which the interested person became an interested person or the business combination, (2)

upon consummation of the transaction which resulted in the interested stockholder becoming an interested stockholder, the interested stockholder owned at least 85% of the voting stock of the corporation outstanding at the time the transaction commenced (excluding certain shares owned by officers, directors or employees) or (3) following the transaction in which such person became an interested stockholder, the business combination is approved by the board of directors of the corporation and authorized at a meeting of stockholders by the affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the outstanding voting stock of the corporation not owned by the interested stockholder. Poison Pill

None. If adopted, not an effective long term structural defense as Canadian securities regulators typically cease trade pills in 100 days or less (generally within 50-75 days) to enable bidder take-up, which eliminates the proponent s need to requisition a meeting to complete a change of control transaction in spite of a board s opposition Adopted April 22, 2014

*

The Valeant Articles were reviewed by ISS Canada in 2013 in connection with Valeant s continuation as a corporation under the BCBCA. ISS Canada recommended approval of the Articles.

Valeant Corporate Governance (3/3)
Provision
Valeant*
Allergan
Consideration of Other
Constituencies
The BCBCA requires that directors and

officers of Valeant act in the best interests

of the corporation

Board and each individual director may consider the interests of the employees, distributors, customers, suppliers and/or creditors of Allergan and its subsidiaries and the communities in which Allergan and its subsidiaries own or lease property or conduct business (Articles)

Amendments to Constating

Documents

66 %

approval

is

required

to

amend

Valeant s Articles (no bylaws) (BCBCA)

Allergan Board is expressly authorized to amend the Bylaws

(Articles)

*

The Valeant Articles were reviewed by ISS Canada in 2013 in connection with Valeant s continuation as a corporation under the BCBCA. ISS Canada recommended approval of the Articles.

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/3