

ROYCE VALUE TRUST INC
Form N-CSRS
August 30, 2010

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
FORM N-CSR

CERTIFIED SHAREHOLDER REPORT
OF
REGISTERED MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES
Investment Company Act file number: 811-04875

Name of Registrant: Royce Value Trust, Inc.

Address of Registrant: 745 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10151

Name and address of agent for service: John E. Denneen, Esquire
745 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10151

Registrant's telephone number, including area code: (212) 508-4500

Date of fiscal year end: December 31

Date of reporting period: January 1, 2010 June 30, 2010

Item 1. Reports to Shareholders.

[Royce Value Trust](#)

[Royce Micro-Cap Trust](#)

[Royce Focus Trust](#)

SEMIANNUAL REVIEW AND REPORT TO STOCKHOLDERS

www.roycefunds.com

A Few Words on Closed-End Funds

Royce & Associates, LLC manages three closed-end funds: Royce Value Trust, the first small-cap value closed-end fund offering; Royce Micro-Cap Trust, the only micro-cap closed-end fund; and Royce Focus Trust, a closed-end fund that invests in a limited number of primarily small-cap companies.

A closed-end fund is an investment company whose shares are listed and traded on a stock exchange. Like all investment companies, including open-end mutual funds, the assets of a closed-end fund are professionally managed in accordance with the investment objectives and policies approved by the Fund's Board of Directors. A closed-end fund raises cash for investment by issuing a fixed number of shares through initial and other public offerings that may include shelf offerings and periodic rights offerings. Proceeds from the offerings are invested in an actively managed portfolio of securities. Investors wanting to buy or sell shares of a publicly traded closed-end fund after the offerings must do so on a stock exchange, as with any publicly traded stock. This is in contrast to open-end mutual funds, in which the fund sells and redeems its shares on a continuous basis.

A Closed-End Fund Offers Several Distinct Advantages Not Available From An Open-End Fund Structure

Since a closed-end fund does not issue redeemable securities or offer its securities on a continuous basis, it does not need to liquidate securities or hold uninvested assets to meet investor demands for cash redemptions, as an open-end fund must.

In a closed-end fund, not having to meet investor redemption requests or invest at inopportune times is ideal for value managers who attempt to buy stocks when prices are depressed and sell securities when prices are high.

A closed-end fund may invest more freely in less liquid portfolio securities because it is not subject to potential stockholder redemption demands. This is particularly beneficial for Royce-managed closed-end funds, which invest in small- and micro-cap securities.

The fixed capital structure allows permanent leverage to be employed as a means to enhance capital appreciation potential.

Unlike Royce's open-end funds, our closed-end funds are able to distribute capital gains on a quarterly basis. In May 2009, the Funds announced the suspension of the quarterly distribution policies for their common stock. Each Fund's Board of Directors will consider lifting the suspension once such Fund's capital loss carryforward has been utilized to offset realized gains. Please see page 19 for more details.

We believe that the closed-end fund structure is very suitable for the long-term investor who understands the benefits of a stable pool of capital.

Why Dividend Reinvestment Is Important

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A very important component of an investor's total return comes from the reinvestment of distributions. By reinvesting distributions, our investors can maintain an undiluted investment in a Fund. To get a fair idea of the impact of reinvested distributions, please see the charts on pages 13, 15 and 17. For additional information on the Funds' Distribution Reinvestment and Cash Purchase Options and the benefits for stockholders, please see page 19 or visit our website at www.roycefunds.com.

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For more than 35 years, we have used a value approach to invest in small-cap securities. We focus primarily on the quality of a company's balance sheet, its ability to generate free cash flow and other measures of profitability or sound financial condition. We then use these factors to assess the company's current worth, basing the assessment on either what we believe a knowledgeable buyer might pay to acquire the entire company, or what we think the value of the company should be in the stock market.

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Performance Table

NAV Average Annual Total Returns

Through June 30, 2010

	Royce Value Trust	Royce Micro-Cap Trust	Royce Focus Trust	Russell 2000
Second Quarter 2010*	-10.41%	-8.94%	-11.05%	-9.92%
Year-to-Date 2010*	-3.03	-1.57	-7.82	-1.95
One-Year	25.43	21.50	20.66	21.48
Three-Year	-9.99	-10.18	-7.68	-8.60
Five-Year	1.15	0.96	5.04	0.37
10-Year	6.44	7.32	10.72	3.00
15-Year	9.08	9.57	n.a.	6.63
20-Year	10.00	n.a.	n.a.	8.16
Since Inception	9.92	9.77	9.75	
Inception Date	11/26/86	12/14/93	11/1/96**	

Important Performance and Risk Information

All performance information in this Review and Report reflects past performance, is presented on a total return basis and reflects the reinvestment of distributions. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate, so that shares may be worth more or less than their original cost when sold. Current performance may be higher or lower than performance quoted. Current month-end performance may be obtained at www.roycefunds.com. The Royce Funds invest primarily in securities of micro-cap, small-cap and mid-cap companies, which may involve considerably more risk than investments in securities of larger-cap companies.

* Not annualized

** Date Royce & Associates, LLC assumed investment management responsibility for the Fund.

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Letter to Our Stockholders

Fear and Trembling

Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards.

Søren Kierkegaard

Thirty-five years ago this summer, the film *Jaws* opened and quickly chomped its way into celluloid history, while also inspiring legions of sweaty beachgoers to stick to the safety of their towels. Yet it is a paraphrase of the ad from the classic Spielberg film's deservedly forgotten sequel—the subtly named *Jaws 2*—that provides the most apt description of investors' attitudes here in the summer of 2010: "Just when you thought it was safe to go back in the market..." After all, in roughly two years, we have moved from a market collapse due in part to a widespread failure to heed Warren Buffett's advice to "beware of geeks bearing formulas" to a market malaise driven by heightened fears about Greeks—to say nothing of Californians or any number of others—bearing debt. In between the financial crisis of late 2008-early 2009 and the market's current struggles (the latter arguably a sequel to the earlier calamity), there was a dynamic market rebound that lasted—at least as of this writing—from the market low on March 9, 2009 through the interim small-cap market high on April 23, 2010. **Unfortunately, equity investors seemed to regard this rally as an all-too-brief respite from a world of ever-declining stock prices and acute economic anxiety.**

We find much to like on a stock-by-stock basis and believe that there is ample proof in the form of strong fundamentals for potentially better days. Investment decisions should not be approached with fear and trembling, but with conviction, confidence and, in our view, an outlook that measures time in years, not months and quarters.

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Charles M. Royce, President

Using mostly broad brush strokes, indexes offer a very useful picture of the markets (or areas of the market) that they represent at specific moments in time. Like every mutual fund manager, we also use indexes as benchmarks against which we compare our own Funds performances. Comparisons are made not simply to calendar-based periods, but to down market and full market cycle periods. We do this because of our long-held conviction that how a portfolio performs in difficult market environments can have an enormous effect on long-term returns, especially those results achieved over full market cycles, which have generally lasted from two to seven years. We also make use of our various benchmark indexes to compare volatility scores, such as Standard Deviation and Return Efficiency.

For each of our closed-end portfolios, we use the small-cap Russell 2000, a broad-based index of domestic small-cap stocks. (Royce Value Trust also uses the S&P SmallCap 600.) As useful and important as benchmark indexes are, they play no role in our portfolio management practices. Their primary significance for us is in providing a measure of how our results stack up vis-à-vis a close approximation to the market in which a particular portfolio invests.

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Letter to Our Stockholders

Looking further back to the beginning of this new century, the markets endured the bursting of the Internet bubble, which brings to two the number of historic market implosions that have occurred within the last 11 years. It is no wonder, then, that so many equity investors are choosing to avoid what they regard as the shark-infested waters of the stock market. For many people who first invested in the stock market at the end of 1999, the experience has been most likely unprofitable (depending, of course, on where their money was invested) and highly, perhaps painfully, volatile. **The evidence is compelling for investors recent dissatisfaction with low or negative returns from stocks and their related impatience with risk and volatility.** The Investment Company Institute (ICI) tracks mutual fund asset flows and reported that in 2009 domestic equity funds had net outflows of \$8.8 billion while fixed income funds took in a record

\$375.5 billion. Strategas Research Partners recently published data from the ICI that showed the trend continuing. For the year-to-date period ended May 31, 2010, outflows from domestic equity funds totaled \$3.8 billion, while inflows to bond funds remained brisk, at \$118.7 billion.

So what do equity managers such as ourselves – patient, disciplined, risk-averse types – make of these sobering figures? Not surprisingly, we still believe in equities. Equally important, our contrarian, long-term outlook leads us to see the potential for solid returns for stocks in the years ahead, provided that investors have the stomach for the bumpy road in front of stocks in the short run. We understand the trepidation, just as we sympathize with those investors who feel as though they have lately been presented with a dismal choice between low-risk, potentially profit-less instruments – bonds or money markets – and risky equities that may not only fail to grow or preserve capital but could also erode or even destroy it. **For our part, we are scrutinizing valuations for micro-cap, small-cap and mid-cap securities all over the globe.** We find much to like on a stock-by-stock basis and believe that there is ample proof in the form of strong fundamentals for potentially better days. Investment decisions should not be approached with fear and trembling, but with conviction, confidence and, in our view, an outlook that measures time in years, not months and quarters.

The Concept of Anxiety

Regardless of the length of one's outlook, recent results for the three major equity indexes were mostly uninspiring and did much to reinforce investors' anxiety. **For the year-to-date period ended June 30, 2010, small-caps, as measured by the Russell 2000 index, owned a performance edge relative to their peers, as the small-cap index was down 1.9%, while the large-cap S&P 500 lost 6.7% and the more tech-oriented Nasdaq Composite fell 7.1%.** These were obviously disappointing results, not merely because of the negative performance, but also because they interrupted the much-needed rally that began with the market low on March 9, 2009. The year opened with a less

damaging correction that the market had shaken off by early February. First-quarter results were positive for all three indexes the Russell 2000 gained 8.9% versus 5.4% for the S&P 500 and 5.7% for the Nasdaq Composite.

The revived rally did not last long, however. Small-cap stock prices peaked on April 23, 2010, and the Russell 2000 slipped 17.6% from that date through the end of June. While the rally had seen other downturns, each had fallen in the range of 9%-10%, making this latest decline easily the most severe for small-caps since the worst days of the financial crisis. These losses lent more than a bearish tint to second-quarter returns, which were negative across the board, putting an end to four consecutive quarters of positive performance for all three domestic indexes. For the second quarter, the Russell 2000 was down 9.9%, the S&P 500 fell 11.4%, and the Nasdaq Composite declined 12.0%.

Markets outside the U.S. fared no better. **The MSCI EAFE (Europe, Australasia and Far East) index was down 13.2% versus a loss of 6.3% for the MSCI World ex USA Small Core index for the six months ended June 30, 2010.** So while returns from the U.S. market bottom on March 9, 2009 through June 30, 2010 remained strong, with each major index up more than 55%, trailing three-year returns ended June 30, 2010 for the three domestic and two non-U.S. indexes were negative, and five-year and 10-year returns were mixed. For the 10-year period, small-caps did best, as the Russell 2000 and MSCI World ex USA Small Core indexes were the top performers.

Within small-cap, growth and value indexes suffered second-quarter losses: the Russell 2000 Value index fell 10.6% versus a loss of 9.2% for the Russell 2000 Growth index. However, year-to-date and one-year results ended June 30, 2010 favored value; three- and five-year results favored growth; and 10-, 15-, 20-, and 25-year results were decidedly won by the Russell 2000 Value index. **Micro-cap companies provided better relative results, outperforming the small-cap index in both the second quarter, in which the Russell Microcap index was down 8.9%, and year-to-date period, when it rose 0.1% through 6/30/10.** Within the micro-cap index, value underperformed in the second quarter (-9.7% versus -7.9%), but outperformed for the six months ended June 30, 2010 (+1.9% versus -1.9%).

Judge For Yourself!

Year-to-date results for our three closed-end portfolios reflected the high level of market volatility. **While the market's gyrations always play a role in performance to some extent, it was particularly visible in the first half, when a few percentage points made the difference between outperformance versus a Fund's respective benchmark index.** Relative performance was not a consistent strength for the portfolios taken as a group. On an NAV (net asset value) basis, only Royce Micro-Cap Trust (RMT) outperformed its particular benchmark during the first half of 2010.

Looking forward, we believe that volatility will continue to be above average, but that small-cap, both domestic and non-U.S., can provide attractive returns over the next three to five years.

However, the investable universe of securities for our portfolios tends to be larger than the number of stocks that constitute an index at any given time, which is why we do not limit ourselves to the stocks that comprise an index.

We prefer the freedom of looking for what we think are attractively valued smaller companies wherever we may find them. For example, as of June 30, 2010, the number of U.S.-domiciled companies with market capitalizations up to \$2.5 billion exceeded 4,500 names, according to FactSet, more than twice the number included in the Russell 2000.

In addition, indexes are fluid entities just as actively managed mutual fund portfolios are, though generally to a lesser degree. Standard & Poor's rebalances their indexes, including the large-cap S&P 500 and the S&P SmallCap 600, on a quarterly basis, as does MSCI. Russell Investments rebalances, or reconstitutes, as they call it, less frequently doing so on an annual basis.

Still, important changes can occur, even in an annual reconstitution. Based on data released from Russell Investments in June 2010, we found some notable changes to the index between June 2009 and June 2010: The index gained an impressive 33.6% for the 12-month period ended May 28, 2010, which helped to increase the index's overall market capitalization 37.9% from 2009 to \$1.2 trillion.

Russell went on to report, The median market capitalization for the index increased to \$441.3 million, a 45%

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Letter to Our Stockholders

Our own reaction was thus somewhat mixed, as returns ran the gamut from marginally negative to more disappointingly so. Interestingly, Royce Focus Trust (FUND) failed to better the year-to-date return of its benchmark, but lost its performance edge during the far more placid (and positive) first quarter. The Fund did not fall as far as its benchmark from the interim high for domestic small-caps on April 23, 2010 through the end of June, while still finishing the first half with poorer performance. **We would usually prefer that our Funds hold their value relative to the benchmark during a downturn to outshining during a short-term up-market period, even if it causes some discouragement in the short run.**

As might be expected during a period in which volatility was high and returns varied, no single sector or industry stood out during the first half the way that the Natural Resources and Technology sectors mostly did in 2009. However, there were some notable patterns. The disaster in the Gulf of Mexico did not deter many oil and gas companies in Royce Value Trust and RMT from strong results, though that sector's energy services group struggled in all three portfolios. (In FUND, the precious metals and mining group stood out positively in the Natural Resources sector.) Financial and industrial companies tended to do relatively poorly, proving especially sensitive to concerns about a double-dip recession. Many Technology holdings also took a step back after enjoying very strong results in 2009 due in part to similar concerns. The two consumer sectors were generally solid, as was performance for the Health sector. However, in the latter's case net gains were modest. **Micro-caps in general did well, as did dividend-payers, the latter helping to narrow the gap after underperforming their small-cap non-dividend paying peers last year.** Looking forward, we believe that volatility will continue to be above average, but that small-cap, both domestic and non-U.S., can provide attractive returns over the next three to five years.

An Edifying Discourse

What inspires our confidence in the long-term prospects for stocks? As is often the case, we look to history for some instruction, while keeping in mind that investing must be done looking forward, not backward. We never expect the past to repeat itself, though we do believe that historical patterns are relevant when it comes to the behavior of markets. The current economic situation has already bred comments claiming that the economy and financial markets are not likely to bounce back soon, mostly owing to an ongoing dearth in consumer spending and the staggering weight of deficits. These commentators predict a scenario in which we are headed for a double-dip recession and could be facing a decade of essentially flat economic growth (or worse), calling to mind Japan over the last 20 years or our own stagnating economy of 1974-1982.

We have a more optimistic outlook. We continue to believe that we have entered a more normalized return environment for equities. We see reason for hope in the fact that many small-cap stocks are reacting positively and negatively to underlying fundamentals not just market sentiment. This has been creating what we regard as attractive short-term opportunities for long-term investors such as ourselves. To us, a return to a more normalized environment may not bring the outsized gains of 2009, but it could usher in a period of positive long-term returns for equities, with historically normal corrections along the way. This would be close to an ideal environment for active managers with an absolute return orientation. Neither whole sectors nor entire industries are on sale as they were in late 2008 and early 2009, but numerous opportunities have been available on a stock-by-stock basis. By seeking to take advantage of this period of increased volatility, we think that investors should be rewarded when the overall direction of the market reverses. While we always keep an eye on the market and economy as a whole, the current situation has not diminished our faith in the long-term prospects for stocks.

Of course, recent declines have been painful. However, it is important to remember that a correction of 15% or more is quite typical, occurring roughly every three years on average for small-cap stocks. Since the Russell 2000 debuted on December 31, 1978, there have been 10 major corrections of at least 15% through the end of 2009. (Note: In order for a new peak to be established, a drop of 15% from the prior peak must first be recorded.) These peak-to-trough periods have ranged from a decline of 15.4% (10/5/79-10/23/79) to the more recent bear market decline of 58.9% (7/13/07- 3/9/09). Of the 10 major declines prior to 2010, the Russell 2000 on average fell 31.8%. **These declines disrupt markets, they shatter confidence, but they also set the stage for new bull markets.**

Any business that looks to be capable of swimming ahead of the pace of the economy as a whole is going to be in high demand, and we can see that benefiting the kind of small-caps that fit our selection

criteria those that boast strong balance sheets, high returns on invested capital and the ability to generate free cash flow.

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increase over the median capitalization of \$304 million in 2009. The weighted average market capitalization also increased significantly, jumping 34.7% to \$1.0B from \$0.7B in 2009. The index's composition is also reflective of the growing global nature of the equity world: As a result of Russell's new methodology rule determining country assignment, all companies that are incorporated, headquartered, and traded in the U.S. are eligible for the Russell U.S. Indexes...Ten of the new adds [of which there were a total of 321 in 2010] are due to the new country rule. Indexes change, and, interestingly, they change in an effort to better reflect the market they are meant to represent. In other words, they change their constituents in order not to change their market representation.

We have high regard for indexes, especially the efforts they make to remain truly representative of their markets. However, we also see critical differences between the kind of work that we as active, disciplined small-cap managers do and what an index does. We do not focus our efforts on creating representative small-cap portfolios (or micro-cap, mid-cap or global smaller-company portfolios). Our task is to find what we judge to be high-quality companies trading at attractive discounts to our estimate of their worth as a business (or intrinsic value). We see indexes, then, as a bellwether to guide us as we strive to improve our skill as disciplined stock pickers. No more and no less than that.

Letter to Our Stockholders

Either/Or

Admittedly, our long-term perspective has been even less in style lately than usual. We have recently been witnessing a stampede out of equities and into fixed income to such a degree that we would not be surprised to see a bubble in fixed income investments in the coming months. (Even bond king Bill Gross is bullish on stocks!) **For our part, we remain convinced that stocks should provide stronger returns, particularly inflation-adjusted returns, over the next five-year and 10-year periods. It seems reasonable to us that the current decade will end up with annualized equity returns somewhere in the high single digits.** Taking advantage of current volatility is, for us, critical toward building strong results for the decade, as well as other long-term periods.

For example, we believe that investors should be encouraged, though not too excited, by the recent earnings picture, bearing in mind that recent earnings look strong in relation to where companies were in 2008 and early 2009, when most were coming off an historically terrible period. (In other words, the bar for earnings improvement was set awfully low.) Still, we think that this is encouraging because it shows that many U.S. corporations did what needed to be done they grew leaner and meaner and effectively dealt with a financial crisis, which is being reflected in stronger earnings. **While the perception seems to be that it is once again struggling, we think the economy is on the right track. We are not wildly enthusiastic, but we are optimistic.**

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Part of our reasoning is that we see a slow-growth economy as a favorable backdrop for our disciplined style, especially owing to its emphasis on company quality. **Our expectation is that a slow-growth economy could lead investors to focus on two areas: high-quality companies and fast-growing companies (the latter not normally our cup of tea).** Any business that looks to be capable of swimming ahead of the pace of the economy as a whole is going to be in high demand, and we can see that benefiting the kind of small-caps that fit our selection criteria: those that boast strong balance sheets, high returns on invested capital and the ability to generate free cash flow. It is also important to remember that long-term growth is not a straight-line phenomenon. Short-term setbacks are a common occurrence in the journey to more lasting success. We are ever-cautious, and in our view it is safe to go back in the water.

Sincerely,

It is important to remember that long-term growth is not a straight-line phenomenon. Short-term setbacks are a common occurrence in the journey to more lasting success. We are ever-cautious, and in our view it is safe to go back in the water.

Charles M.
Royce
President

W. Whitney
George
Vice President

Jack E. Fockler, Jr.
Vice President

P.S. More than this letter's epigraph comes from the pen of Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard, as each of the headings uses the title from one of his books. We thought that Kierkegaard made an especially appropriate choice for the period under review, with his emphasis on the absurdity of life, the necessity for self-examination and the need to live life looking forward.

July 31, 2010

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Small-Cap Market Cycle Performance

We believe strongly in the idea that a long-term investment perspective is crucial for determining the success of a particular investment approach. Flourishing in an up market is wonderful. Surviving a bear market by losing less (or not at all) is at least as good. However, the true test of a portfolio's mettle is performance over full market cycle periods, which include both up and down market periods. We believe that providing full market cycle results is more appropriate even than showing three- to five-year standardized returns because the latter periods may not include the up and down phases that constitute a full market cycle.

Since the Russell 2000's inception on 12/31/78, value as measured by the Russell 2000 Value Index outperformed growth as measured by the Russell 2000 Growth Index in six of the small-cap index's eight full market cycles. The most recently concluded cycle, which ran from 3/9/00 through 7/13/07, was the longest in the index's history, and represented what we believe was a return to more historically typical performance in that value provided a significant advantage during its downturn (3/9/00-10/9/02) and for the full cycle. In contrast, the new market cycle that began on 7/13/07 has so far favored growth over value, an unsurprising development when one considers how thoroughly value dominated growth in the previous full cycle.

Peak-to-Peak (3/9/00-7/13/07)

For the full cycle, value provided a sizeable margin over growth, which finished the period with a loss. Each of our closed-end funds held a sizeable performance advantage over the Russell 2000 on both an NAV (net asset value) and market price basis. On an NAV basis, Royce Focus Trust (+264.2%) was our best performer by a wide margin, followed by Royce Micro-Cap Trust (+175.9%) and Royce Value Trust (+161.3%). The latter two funds in particular benefited from their use of leverage during this, as well as in subsequent bullish periods.

Peak-to-Current (7/13/07-6/30/10)

During the difficult, volatile decline that ended 3/9/09, both value and growth posted similarly negative returns. Events in the financial markets immediately preceding the end of 2008's third quarter caused the Russell 2000 to decline significantly. After a brief rally at the end of 2008, the index continued to fall, though it has since recovered significantly, gaining 80.9% from 3/9/09 through 6/30/10.

Royce Focus Trust managed to outperform the index during the decline, while Royce Value Trust and Royce Micro-Cap Trust outperformed during the rally from 3/9/09 through 6/30/10.

ROYCE FUNDS NAV TOTAL RETURNS VS. RUSSELL 2000 INDEX: MARKET CYCLE RESULTS				
	Peak-to-Peak 3/9/00- 7/13/07	Peak-to-Trough 7/13/07- 3/9/09	Trough-to-Current 3/9/09- 6/30/10	Peak-to-Current 7/13/07- 6/30/10
Russell 2000	54.8%	-58.9%	80.9%	-25.6%
Russell 2000 Value	189.4	-61.1	85.0	-28.1
Russell 2000 Growth	-14.8	-56.8	76.8	-23.6
Royce Value Trust	161.3	-65.6	105.9	-29.1

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Royce Micro-Cap Trust	175.9	-66.3	110.6	-29.1
Royce Focus Trust	264.2	-58.3	80.3	-24.7

The thoughts concerning recent market movements and future prospects for smaller-company stocks are solely those of Royce & Associates and, of course, there can be no assurance with regard to future market movements. Smaller-company stocks may involve considerably more risk than larger-cap stocks. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. See page 2 for important performance information for all of the above funds.

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AVERAGE ANNUAL NAV TOTAL RETURNS

Through 6/30/10

Jan-June 2010*	-3.03%
One-Year	25.43
Three-Year	-9.99
Five-Year	1.15
10-Year	6.44
15-Year	9.08
20-Year	10.00
Since Inception (11/26/86)	9.92

*Not annualized

CALENDAR YEAR NAV TOTAL RETURNS

Year	RVT	Year	RVT
2009	44.6%	2000	16.6%
2008	-45.6	1999	11.7
2007	5.0	1998	3.3
2006	19.5	1997	27.5
2005	8.4	1996	15.5
2004	21.4	1995	21.6
2003	40.8	1994	0.1
2002	-15.6	1993	17.3
2001	15.2	1992	19.3

TOP 10 POSITIONS% of Net Assets Applicable
to Common Stockholders

Ash Grove Cement Cl. B	1.1%
Alleghany Corporation	1.0

Sapient Corporation	0.9
Coherent	0.9
AllianceBernstein Holding L.P.	0.9
Sotheby's	0.9
PAREXEL International	0.9
SEACOR Holdings	0.9
SEI Investments	0.9
Cimarex Energy	0.8

PORTFOLIO SECTOR BREAKDOWN

% of Net Assets Applicable to Common Stockholders

Industrial Products	22.4%
Technology	19.9
Industrial Services	14.6
Financial Services	12.6
Financial Intermediaries	12.1
Natural Resources	10.9
Consumer Products	8.4
Health	7.5
Consumer Services	4.1
Diversified Investment Companies	0.4
Miscellaneous	4.7
Preferred Stocks	0.2
Cash and Cash Equivalents	8.9

Royce Value Trust

Manager's Discussion

Royce Value Trust (RVT) struggled to differentiate itself in the volatile and highly correlated period for equity returns that defined 2010's first half. **For the year-to-date period ended June 30, 2010, RVT lost 3.0% on an NAV (net asset value) basis, and 2.0% based on market price, underperforming its unleveraged small-cap benchmarks, the Russell 2000, which fell 1.9%, and the S&P SmallCap 600, which fell 0.9% for the period.** In the bullish first quarter, which marked a continuation of the strong rally off the lows set in March 2009, the Fund rose 8.2% and 9.8% on an NAV and market price basis, respectively, while the Russell 2000 was up 8.9%, and the S&P SmallCap 600 advanced 8.6%. In the second quarter, when stock prices fell precipitously following new concerns over sovereign finances, specifically in Europe, RVT fell victim to the correlated downward move in stock prices with an NAV decline of 10.4% and a market price loss of 10.8% compared to the Russell 2000's drop of 9.9%, and the S&P SmallCap 600's decline of 8.7%.

While results through the end of June were disappointing on both an absolute and relative basis, over most longer-term time periods the Fund's NAV returns were solid on a relative basis. Absolute NAV returns were more mixed, however. RVT showed strength for the one-, 10-, 15-, 20-year and since inception (11/26/86) periods, but the three-year and five-year periods were more challenging on an absolute basis, falling short of the strong absolute results that we strive to provide. The impact

of the severe bear market of 2008 was the primary contributor to this shortfall. Still, we were very pleased that our style of active, disciplined management allowed RVT to beat the Russell 2000 on an NAV basis for the one-, five-, 10-, 15-, 20-year and since inception periods ended June 30, 2010. The Fund also beat the S&P SmallCap 600 for most of these periods, though it trailed over the difficult three-year span. **RVT's NAV average annual total return since inception was 9.9%.**

In the first half of 2010, sector performance reflected the high degree of individual stock correlation that defined the period. Only three of the Fund's 11 equity sectors managed to contribute positively to returns, though the eight that detracted posted modest net losses. What anchored individual stocks and sectors together was a broad-based increase in negative sentiment that led to chiefly undifferentiated moves among equities of all shapes and sizes. Not surprisingly, defensive sectors such as Health and Consumer Products maintained their gains in the period as investors sought the relative safety of investments less sensitive to cyclical factors and more reliant on non-discretionary consumption.

Positive contributors at the industry level were insurance companies, the software group, and food, beverage and tobacco stocks, the latter accentuating the pervasively defensive theme in the period.

GOOD IDEAS THAT WORKED Top Contributors to Performance* Year-to-Date Through 6/30/10

PAREXEL International	0.28%
Cimarex Energy	0.19
Sapient Corporation	0.17
Advisory Board (The)	0.16
Richardson Electronics	0.14

*Includes dividends

Important Performance and Risk Information

All performance information reflects past performance, is presented on a total return basis and reflects the reinvestment of distributions. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Current performance may be higher or lower than performance quoted. Returns as of the most recent month-end may be obtained at www.roycefunds.com. The market price of the Fund's shares will fluctuate, so that shares may be worth more or less than their original cost when sold. The Fund invests primarily in securities of small and micro-cap companies, which may involve considerably more risk than investing in a more diversified portfolio of larger-cap companies. The sum of all contributions and deductions for all securities would approximate the Fund's year-to-date performance for 2010.

Performance and Portfolio Review

The Industrial Products and Industrial Services sectors made the largest negative impact on performance as investors shunned those areas deemed overly exposed to the growing risks of a soft patch in the economy or, worse, a double-dip recession. Persistently high unemployment, a stubbornly depressed housing market, a pullback in leading economic indicators in the U.S., growing anxiety about the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and risks of a slowdown in the Chinese economy growth all conspired to send investors scrambling for the perceived safe haven of U.S. bonds. Investment management companies and securities brokers, along with metal fabrication and distribution businesses, were among RVT's worst performing industries.

While correlation of individual stocks rose throughout the first half, there still was a healthy dispersion of individual stock returns in the Fund. RVT's top performer in the period was an old favorite, PAREXEL International. This global provider of drug development services focusing on clinical research outsourcing benefited from increased emphasis by the pharmaceutical industry on new drug development. With pipelines depleting, both large and small pharmaceutical companies sought PAREXEL's highly integrated platform of global clinical research to advance new and innovative drug development. Cimarex Energy was another notable gainer as this Denver based oil and gas exploration and production company sported some of the highest production growth in the industry while keeping capital expenditures well below internally generated cash flow.

On the negative front, a notable loser came from our favored asset management industry. Artio Global Investors is a global asset manager offering both fixed income and equity funds with a primary emphasis in international equity. Although it was hurt by the substantial dislocation in Europe following the Greek debt crisis, we remain optimistic about the firm's long-term potential in a recovering global stock market. Vaisala is a Finnish technology company serving a global niche market in measurement systems for a variety of environmental sciences. The company suffered depressed margins after issuing a profit warning due to delivery problems in a new IT system. Recent investments in growth initiatives will also need more time to develop. With a strong balance sheet and healthy dividend yield, we are comfortable being patient.

GOOD IDEAS AT THE TIME Top Detractors from Performance* Year-to-Date Through 6/30/10

Artio Global Investors Cl. A	-0.15%
Vaisala Cl. A	-0.15
Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers	-0.15
Preformed Line Products	-0.15
Lazard Cl. A	-0.13

*Net of dividends

MARKET PRICE PERFORMANCE HISTORY SINCE INCEPTION (11/26/86) through 6/30/10

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Reflects the cumulative total return of an investment made by a stockholder who purchased one share at inception (\$10.00 IPO), reinvested all annual distributions as indicated and fully participated in primary subscriptions of the Fund's rights offerings.

²Reflects the actual market price of one share as it traded on the NYSE.

FUND INFORMATION AND PORTFOLIO DIAGNOSTICS

Average Market Capitalization*	\$1,073 million
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Weighted Average P/E Ratio**	15.7x
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Weighted Average P/B Ratio	1.7x
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U.S. Investments (% of Net Assets applicable to Common Stockholders)	101.5%
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Non-U.S. Investments (% of Net Assets applicable to Common Stockholders)	16.5%
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Fund Total Net Assets	\$1,044 million
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Net Leverage	18%
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Turnover Rate	13%
---------------	-----

Number of Holdings	689
--------------------	-----

Symbol	
Market Price	RVT
NAV	XRVTX

*Geometrically calculated

**The Fund's P/E ratio calculation excludes companies with zero or negative earnings (15% of portfolio holdings as of 6/30/10).

Net leverage is the percentage, in excess of 100%, of the total value of equity type investments, divided by net assets, excluding preferred stock.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Publicly Traded Securities Outstanding at 6/30/10 at NAV or Liquidation Value

66.0 million shares of Common Stock	\$824 million
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5.90% Cumulative Preferred Stock	\$220 million
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**DOWN MARKET PERFORMANCE
COMPARISON**

All Down Periods of 7.5% or Greater
Over the Last 10 Years, in
Percentages(%)

AVERAGE ANNUAL NAV TOTAL RETURNS

Through 6/30/10

Jan-June 2010*	-1.57%
One-Year	21.50
Three-Year	-10.18
Five-Year	0.96
10-Year	7.32
15-Year	9.57
Since Inception (12/14/93)	9.77

*Not annualized

CALENDAR YEAR NAV TOTAL RETURNS

Year	RMT	Year	RMT
2009	46.5%	2001	23.4%
2008	-45.5	2000	10.9
2007	0.6	1999	12.7
2006	22.5	1998	-4.1
2005	6.8	1997	27.1
2004	18.7	1996	16.6
2003	55.5	1995	22.9
2002	-13.8	1994	5.0

TOP 10 POSITIONS

% of Net Assets Applicable to Common Stockholders

Kennedy-Wilson Holdings	2.7%
Sapient Corporation	2.1
Seneca Foods	1.8
iGATE Corporation	1.3

Tennant Company	1.3
Pegasystems	1.1
Epoch Holding Corporation	1.0
SFN Group	1.0
Richardson Electronics	0.9
Advisory Board (The)	0.9

PORTFOLIO SECTOR BREAKDOWN

% of Net Assets Applicable to Common Stockholders

Industrial Products	23.2%
Technology	18.4
Industrial Services	13.8
Natural Resources	12.1
Financial Intermediaries	9.8
Financial Services	9.8
Health	9.6
Consumer Products	9.1
Consumer Services	3.4
Diversified Investment Companies	1.3
Miscellaneous	4.9
Preferred Stock	0.6
Cash and Cash Equivalents	9.1

Royce Micro-Cap Trust

Manager's Discussion

Royce Micro-Cap Trust's (RMT) broadly diversified portfolio of micro-cap stocks began 2010 with the same luster that had led to distinguished returns in

2009, only to fall victim to the precipitous drop in equity prices that occurred beginning in late April. **RMT lost 1.6% on an NAV (net asset value) basis for the first half of 2010, and 0.4% based on market price, slightly outperforming its unleveraged small-cap benchmark, the Russell 2000, which declined 1.9%, and underperforming the Russell Microcap index, which rose a modest 0.1% for the same period.** The Fund managed to keep pace in the bullish first quarter as stocks extended their gains off the March 2009 low. For the quarter, RMT gained 8.1% on an NAV basis and 11.1% based on market price, compared to respective advances of 8.9% and 9.9% for the Russell 2000 and Russell Microcap indexes. When stock prices rolled over and began their sharp descent in the second quarter, the Fund lost 8.9% on an NAV basis and 10.4% on a market price basis. For the same period, the Russell 2000 fell 9.9%, and the Russell Microcap lost 8.9%.

The market decline that began on April 23, 2010 and continued through the end of the period was as severe as it was unwelcome. During this period, RMT was unable to break from the market's grasp and fell largely in line with its benchmarks. Declines for the Fund were 16.4% (NAV) and 18.9% (market price) compared to losses of 17.6% for the Russell 2000 and 18.1% for the Russell Microcap index. So while the Fund gave up a bit of ground from the market low on March 9, 2009 through June 30, 2010, it maintained its impressive lead, up 110.6% (NAV) and 115.9% (market price) compared to the Russell 2000, which was up 80.9% and the Russell Microcap index which rose 86.2%.

More importantly, we continue to be pleased with the Fund's long-term NAV performances on a relative basis. RMT beat the Russell Microcap index for the one-, three-, five- and 10-year periods ended June 30, 2010, while outpacing the Russell 2000 for the one-, five-, 10-, 15-year and since inception (12/14/93) periods ended June 30, 2010. (Data for the Russell Microcap index goes back only to 2000.)

The Fund's NAV average annual total return since inception was 9.8%.

For the first half of 2010, six of the Fund's 10 equity sectors made positive contributions to performance, with Technology being the main bright spot. Within that sector, the components and systems industry and semiconductors and equipment group each benefited

GOOD IDEAS THAT WORKED
Top Contributors to Performance*
Year-to-Date Through 6/30/10

Sapient Corporation	0.39%
Hardinge	0.39
Virage Logic	0.38
Thomas Weisel Partners Group	0.29
Richardson Electronics	0.25

*Includes dividends

Important Performance and Risk Information

All performance information reflects past performance, is presented on a total return basis and reflects the reinvestment of distributions. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Current performance may be higher or lower than performance quoted. Returns as of the most recent month-end may be obtained at www.roycefunds.com. The market price of the Fund's shares will fluctuate, so that shares may be worth more or less than their original cost when sold. The Fund normally invests in micro-cap companies, which may involve considerably more risk than investing in a more diversified portfolio of larger-cap companies. The sum of all contributions and detractions for all securities would approximate the Fund's year-to-date performance for 2010.

Performance and Portfolio Review

from the thawing of some IT budgets. Interestingly, machinery was the best performing industry in the period even though it hails from within the economically challenged Industrial Products sector. Detractors from first-half results came mostly from the more cyclical sectors of the market and reflected growing concerns that the initial phase of the economic recovery was giving way to a more uncertain pace. Inventory restocking in the industrial and retail segments of the economy, which had added a pleasant tailwind to orders as we entered the year, appeared to have run its course with new order activity perceived to be ever more reliant on suspect end-market demand. Reflecting this dynamic, Industrial Services and Natural Resources struggled, as did Consumer Services. At the industry level, energy services companies led all decliners, as the impact of the temporary ban on deep-water drilling following BP's Gulf oil spill hurt the short-term prospects of these businesses.

The Fund's top performer was Sapient Corporation, a leading business consulting and technology services firm that was a direct beneficiary of improved technology and marketing spending from its corporate customers. Another performer of note was Hardinge, a manufacturer of metal cutting lathes and other tooling machinery and accessories that received an unsolicited takeover offer from Industrias Romi, a global leader in machine tools. We chose to reduce our position into the resulting improvement in its share price as we were somewhat skeptical of the potential outcome.

GOOD IDEAS AT THE TIME

Top Detractors from Performance*
Year-to-Date Through 6/30/10

Willbros Group	-0.57%
FBR Capital Markets	-0.35
Stein Mart	-0.30
Charming Shoppes	-0.26
Cowen Group Cl. A	-0.24

On the negative side, the stock price of Willbros Group, an engineering and construction company primarily serving the oil and gas industry, fell sharply as concerns regarding project delays, another result of the Gulf spill, weighed on its shares. We chose to weigh the firm's limited direct exposure to offshore construction projects and attractive valuation and used the weakness to add to our position. FBR Capital Markets provides a range of investment banking, institutional brokerage and asset management activities. Depressed levels of capital markets activity and delayed equity offerings led to a quarterly revenue and earnings miss that then drove down its share price.

*Net of dividends

MARKET PRICE PERFORMANCE HISTORY SINCE INCEPTION (12/14/93) through 6/30/10

¹Reflects the cumulative total return of an investment made by a stockholder who purchased one share at inception (\$7.50 IPO),

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reinvested distributions as indicated and fully participated in the primary subscription of the 1994 rights offering.

²Reflects the actual market price of one share as it traded on the NYSE and, prior to 12/1/03, on Nasdaq.

FUND INFORMATION AND PORTFOLIO DIAGNOSTICS

Average Market Capitalization*	\$290 million
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Weighted Average P/B Ratio	1.4x
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U.S. Investments (% of Net Assets applicable to Common Stockholders)	107.6%
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Non-U.S. Investments (% of Net Assets applicable to Common Stockholders)	8.3%
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Fund Total Net Assets	\$299 million
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Net Leverage**	16%
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Turnover Rate	10%
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Number of Holdings	358
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Symbol	
Market Price	RMT
NAV	XOTCX

*Geometrically calculated

**Net leverage is the percentage, in excess of 100%, of the total value of equity type investments, divided by net assets, excluding preferred stock.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Publicly Traded Securities Outstanding at 6/30/10 at NAV or Liquidation Value

27.3 million shares of Common Stock	\$239 million
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6.00% Cumulative Preferred Stock	\$60 million
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DOWN MARKET PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

All Down Periods of 7.5% or Greater
Over the Last 10 Years, in Percentages(%)

AVERAGE ANNUAL NAV TOTAL RETURNS

Through 6/30/10

Jan-June 2010*	-7.82%
One-Year	20.66
Three-Year	-7.68
Five-Year	5.04
10-Year	10.72
Since Inception (11/1/96)**	9.75

*Not annualized

**Royce & Associates assumed investment management responsibility for the Fund on 11/1/96.

CALENDAR YEAR NAV TOTAL RETURNS

Year	FUND	Year	FUND
2009	54.0%	2002	-12.5%
2008	-42.7	2001	10.0
2007	12.2	2000	20.9
2006	16.3	1999	8.7
2005	13.3	1998	-6.8
2004	29.2	1997	20.5
2003	54.3		

TOP 10 POSITIONS

% of Net Assets Applicable to Common Stockholders

Berkshire Hathaway Cl. B	4.9%
Seabridge Gold	3.6
Sanderson Farms	3.3
Kennedy-Wilson Holdings	3.1

Buckle (The)	3.0
GrafTech International	2.8
ENSCO ADR	2.7
Reliance Steel & Aluminum	2.5
Mosaic Company (The)	2.4
Trican Well Service	2.4

PORTFOLIO SECTOR BREAKDOWN

% of Net Assets Applicable
to Common Stockholders

Natural Resources	29.7%
Industrial Products	19.7
Consumer Products	12.1
Financial Services	11.0
Technology	7.9
Financial Intermediaries	7.0
Consumer Services	5.8
Industrial Services	5.1
Health	1.3
Miscellaneous	0.9
Cash and Cash Equivalents	18.7

Royce Focus Trust

Manager's Discussion

Royce Focus Trust (FUND) fell 7.8% on an NAV (net asset value) basis and 9.3% on a market price basis for the year-to-date period ended June 30, 2010, in each case underperforming its small-cap benchmark, the Russell 2000, which was down 1.9% for the same period. This was a discouraging result, not just because negative returns are unwelcome or because we never enjoy being outpaced by the Russell 2000, but also because it disrupted the momentum that the Fund had established with a terrific showing in 2009. Still, we do not put too much

emphasis on short-term results even when they are notable on both an absolute and relative basis because the Fund's focus is on longer-term time spans of three years or more.

The rally that enlivened much of 2009 stalled as the new year began, with stock prices tumbling through January and into early February before stock prices revived. This meant a mostly strong first quarter for equities. The limited portfolio of mostly small-cap stocks in Royce Focus Trust was up 3.6% on an NAV basis and 5.4% on a market price basis for 2010's opening quarter, in each case behind its small-cap benchmark, the Russell 2000, which was up 8.9%. Although the market was doing well as the second quarter began in April, a more severe and lasting correction had set in by the end of the month, one that continued through the end of June. For the second quarter, FUND was down 11.1% on an NAV basis and 13.9% on a market prices basis versus a decline of 9.9% for the Russell 2000.

The Fund's NAV performance was stronger than its market price results during the correction that followed the interim small-cap high in late April. From April 23, 2010 through June 30, 2010, FUND lost 15.7% on an NAV basis and 19.5% on a market price basis compared to a loss of 17.6% for its benchmark. The Fund fell behind the Russell 2000 from the March 9, 2009 market low through June 30, 2010, rising 80.3% on an NAV basis and 68.3% on a market price basis while the small-cap index gained 80.9%. However, FUND outpaced the Russell 2000 on an NAV basis for the three-, five-, 10-year and since inception of our management (11/1/96) periods ended June 30, 2010, and for each of these periods except the three year span on a market price basis. **The Fund's NAV average annual total return since inception was 9.8%.**

The Industrial Products sector detracted most from performance through the end of June. A top-10 position, The Mosaic Company produces concentrated phosphate and potash crop nutrients for the agriculture industry. Its share price grew at a healthy rate in 2009, in part because takeover rumors ran rampant through its industry. We like its business, its balance sheet and its high returns on invested capital, so we added to our position in May. As investors fled the stock market, as well as other capital markets, the performance of many

GOOD IDEAS THAT WORKED
Top Contributors to Performance*
Year-to-Date Through 6/30/10

Seabridge Gold	0.55%
Berkshire Hathaway Cl. B	0.49
Allied Nevada Gold	0.40
Sanderson Farms	0.39
KKR Financial Holdings	0.34

*Includes dividends

Important Performance and Risk Information

All performance information reflects past performance, is presented on a total return basis and reflects the reinvestment of distributions. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Current performance may be higher or lower than performance quoted. Returns as of the most recent month-end may be obtained at www.roycefunds.com. The market price of the Fund's shares will fluctuate, so that shares may be worth more or less than their original cost when sold. The Fund normally invests primarily in small-cap companies, which may involve considerably more risk than investing in a more diversified portfolio of larger-cap companies. The sum of all contributions and deductions for all securities would approximate the Fund's year-to-date performance for 2010.

Performance and Portfolio Review

financial stocks was hampered, which helped to make investment management companies the portfolio's poorest-performing industry group. Western Digital, one of the top three global manufacturers of computer hard drives, boasts a strong balance sheet, competitive positioning and, thanks to its recent share price decline, a highly attractive valuation. Conditions in its industry grew more challenging, as the company ceded some market share to defend pricing, so we built a large enough stake to make it FUND's 17th largest holding at the end of June.

U.S. Global Investors manages equity and fixed income mutual funds, investing primarily in the public equity, fixed income, gold and natural resources markets across the globe. We think its expertise in asset management is a key strength. Long-time Royce favorite Thor Industries also hit the high-speed lane in 2009 before stalling in this year's first half. The stock of this RV (recreational vehicle) and small- and mid-sized bus manufacturer plummeted mostly as a result of a delayed 10-Q filing based on an auditor's review of its past accounting policies. However, the auditor signed off on the filing without requiring any changes or restatements. Sales were also slow after months of recovery, though we think its dominant position in its industry will allow it to return to the fast lane over the long haul. Major Drilling Group International is a leading provider of contract drilling services for metals miners. The company, which provides specialized contract drilling services for metals miners, suffered through reduced levels of activity from larger mining companies in the last months of 2009. Although activity was picking up in 2010, with the company offering an optimistic outlook, it was not enough to sway most investors.

GOOD IDEAS AT THE TIME Top Detractors from Performance* Year-to-Date Through 6/30/10

Mosaic Company (The)	-0.95%
Western Digital	-0.68
U.S. Global Investors Cl. A	-0.64
Thor Industries	-0.53
Major Drilling Group International	-0.52

*Net of dividends

Canadian gold mining business, Seabridge Gold, enjoyed success as reserves in a mine in British Columbia were verified and drilling commenced, which helped to drive up its stock price. It was the Fund's second-largest holding at the end of June. In January, we initiated a position in the Fund's largest holding at the end of the first half, Berkshire Hathaway, a familiar name to many investors as the company associated with Warren Buffett. We admire his expertise as well and were pleased to see the stock climb during 2010's first six months.

MARKET PRICE PERFORMANCE HISTORY SINCE INCEPTION (11/1/96)¹ through 6/30/10

¹Royce & Associates assumed investment management responsibility for the Fund on 11/1/96.

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²Reflects the cumulative total return experience of a continuous common stockholder who reinvested all distributions as indicated and fully participated in the primary subscription of the 2005 rights offering.

³Reflects the actual market price of one share as it traded on Nasdaq.

FUND INFORMATION AND PORTFOLIO DIAGNOSTICS

Average Market Capitalization*	\$2,358 million
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Weighted Average P/E Ratio**	12.9x
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Weighted Average P/B Ratio	1.6x
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U.S. Investments (% of Net Assets applicable to Common Stockholders)	84.5%
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Non-U.S. Investments (% of Net Assets applicable to Common Stockholders)	15.9%
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Fund Total Net Assets	\$155 million
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Net Leverage	1%
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Turnover Rate	20%
---------------	-----

Number of Holdings	60
--------------------	----

Symbol	FUND
Market Price	XFUNX
NAV	XFUNX

*Geometrically calculated

**The Fund's P/E ratio calculation excludes companies with zero or negative earnings (24% of portfolio holdings as of 6/30/10).

Net leverage is the percentage, in excess of 100%, of the total value of equity type investments, divided by net assets, excluding preferred stock.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Publicly Traded Securities Outstanding
at 6/30/10 at NAV or Liquidation Value

19.8 million shares of Common Stock	\$130 million
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6.00% Cumulative Preferred Stock	\$25 million
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**DOWN MARKET PERFORMANCE
COMPARISON**

All Down Periods of 7.5% or Greater
Over the Last 10 Years, in Percentages(%)

History Since Inception

The following table details the share accumulations by an initial investor in the Funds who reinvested all distributions (including fractional shares) and participated fully in primary subscriptions for each of the rights offerings. Full participation in distribution reinvestments and rights offerings can maximize the returns available to a long-term investor. This table should be read in conjunction with the Performance and Portfolio Reviews of the Funds.

History		Amount Invested	Purchase Price ¹	Shares	NAV Value ²	Market Value ²
Royce Value Trust						
11/26/86	Initial Purchase	\$ 10,000	\$ 10.000	1,000	\$ 9,280	\$ 10,000
10/15/87	Distribution \$0.30		7.000	42		
12/31/87	Distribution \$0.22		7.125	32	8,578	7,250
12/27/88	Distribution \$0.51		8.625	63	10,529	9,238
9/22/89	Rights Offering	405	9.000	45		
12/29/89	Distribution \$0.52		9.125	67	12,942	11,866
9/24/90	Rights Offering	457	7.375	62		
12/31/90	Distribution \$0.32		8.000	52	11,713	11,074
9/23/91	Rights Offering	638	9.375	68		
12/31/91	Distribution \$0.61		10.625	82	17,919	15,697
9/25/92	Rights Offering	825	11.000	75		
12/31/92	Distribution \$0.90		12.500	114	21,999	20,874
9/27/93	Rights Offering	1,469	13.000	113		
12/31/93	Distribution \$1.15		13.000	160	26,603	25,428
10/28/94	Rights Offering	1,103	11.250	98		
12/19/94	Distribution \$1.05		11.375	191	27,939	24,905
11/3/95	Rights Offering	1,425	12.500	114		
12/7/95	Distribution \$1.29		12.125	253	35,676	31,243
12/6/96	Distribution \$1.15		12.250	247	41,213	36,335
1997	Annual distribution total \$1.21		15.374	230	52,556	46,814
1998	Annual distribution total \$1.54		14.311	347	54,313	47,506
1999	Annual distribution total \$1.37		12.616	391	60,653	50,239
2000	Annual distribution total \$1.48		13.972	424	70,711	61,648
2001	Annual distribution total \$1.49		15.072	437	81,478	73,994
2002	Annual distribution total \$1.51		14.903	494	68,770	68,927
1/28/03	Rights Offering	5,600	10.770	520		
2003	Annual distribution total \$1.30		14.582	516	106,216	107,339
2004	Annual distribution total \$1.55		17.604	568	128,955	139,094
2005	Annual distribution total \$1.61		18.739	604	139,808	148,773
2006	Annual distribution total \$1.78		19.696	693	167,063	179,945
2007	Annual distribution total \$1.85		19.687	787	175,469	165,158
2008	Annual distribution total \$1.72		12.307	1,294	95,415	85,435
3/11/09	Distribution \$0.32 ³		6.071	537	137,966	115,669
6/30/10		\$ 21,922		10,720	\$133,786	\$113,310
Royce Micro-Cap Trust						
12/14/93	Initial Purchase	\$ 7,500	\$ 7.500	1,000	\$ 7,250	\$ 7,500
10/28/94	Rights Offering	1,400	7.000	200		
12/19/94	Distribution \$0.05		6.750	9	9,163	8,462
12/7/95	Distribution \$0.36		7.500	58	11,264	10,136
12/6/96	Distribution \$0.80		7.625	133	13,132	11,550
12/5/97	Distribution \$1.00		10.000	140	16,694	15,593
12/7/98	Distribution \$0.29		8.625	52	16,016	14,129
12/6/99	Distribution \$0.27		8.781	49	18,051	14,769
12/6/00	Distribution \$1.72		8.469	333	20,016	17,026
12/6/01	Distribution \$0.57		9.880	114	24,701	21,924
2002	Annual distribution total \$0.80		9.518	180	21,297	19,142
2003	Annual distribution total \$0.92		10.004	217	33,125	31,311
2004	Annual distribution total \$1.33		13.350	257	39,320	41,788

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2005	Annual distribution total \$1.85		13.848	383	41,969	45,500
2006	Annual distribution total \$1.55		14.246	354	51,385	57,647
2007	Annual distribution total \$1.35		13.584	357	51,709	45,802
2008	Annual distribution total \$1.19		8.237	578	28,205	24,807
3/11/09	Distribution \$0.22 ³		4.260	228	41,314	34,212
6/30/10		\$ 8,900		4,642	\$ 40,664	\$ 34,072
Royce Focus Trust						
10/31/96	Initial Purchase	\$ 4,375	\$ 4.375	1,000	\$ 5,280	\$ 4,375
12/31/96					5,520	4,594
12/5/97	Distribution \$0.53		5.250	101	6,650	5,574
12/31/98					6,199	5,367
12/6/99	Distribution \$0.145		4.750	34	6,742	5,356
12/6/00	Distribution \$0.34		5.563	69	8,151	6,848
12/6/01	Distribution \$0.14		6.010	28	8,969	8,193
12/6/02	Distribution \$0.09		5.640	19	7,844	6,956
12/8/03	Distribution \$0.62		8.250	94	12,105	11,406
2004	Annual distribution total \$1.74		9.325	259	15,639	16,794
5/6/05	Rights offering	2,669	8.340	320		
2005	Annual distribution total \$1.21		9.470	249	21,208	20,709
2006	Annual distribution total \$1.57		9.860	357	24,668	27,020
2007	Annual distribution total \$2.01		9.159	573	27,679	27,834
2008	Annual distribution total \$0.47		6.535	228	15,856	15,323
3/11/09	Distribution \$0.09 ³		3.830	78	24,408	21,579
6/30/10		\$ 7,044		3,409	\$ 22,499	\$ 19,568

¹ Beginning with the 1997 (RVT), 2002 (RMT) and 2004 (FUND) distributions through 2008, the purchase price of distributions is a weighted average of the distribution reinvestment prices for the year.

² Other than for initial purchase and June 30, 2010, values are stated as of December 31 of the year indicated, after reinvestment of distributions.

³ Includes a return of capital.

Distribution Reinvestment and Cash Purchase Options

Why did the Funds suspend their managed distribution policies for common stockholders?

The Boards of Directors suspended the Funds' quarterly distribution policies in December, 2009 because of the potentially adverse tax consequences that could occur if the policies were to continue. In certain circumstances, returns of capital could be taxable for federal income tax purposes, and all or a portion of the Funds' capital loss carryforwards from prior years could effectively be forfeited. The Funds intend the suspension to continue until such time as they can again regularly distribute net realized gains, which should occur after they have utilized their capital loss carryforwards. Until such time, the Funds will distribute any net investment income on an annual basis in December.

Why should I reinvest my distributions?

By reinvesting distributions, a stockholder can maintain an undiluted investment in the Fund. The regular reinvestment of distributions has a significant impact on stockholder returns. In contrast, the stockholder who takes distributions in cash is penalized when shares are issued below net asset value to other stockholders.

How does the reinvestment of distributions from the Royce closed-end funds work?

The Funds automatically issue shares in payment of distributions unless you indicate otherwise. The shares are generally issued at the lower of the market price or net asset value on the valuation date.

How does this apply to registered stockholders?

If your shares are registered directly with a Fund, your distributions are automatically reinvested unless you have otherwise instructed the Funds' transfer agent, Computershare, in writing. A registered stockholder also has the option to receive the distribution in the form of a stock c